Elections in Moldova: A vulnerable state in the Kremlin’s crosshairs

Moldova is approaching its parliamentary elections amid economic instability, political polarisation and active Russian interference. The Kremlin views Moldova as part of its traditional sphere of influence, a lever of pressure on Ukraine and Europe, and a channel for covert operations. It seeks to weaken pro-European forces through bribery, disinformation, street protests and criminal networks. The interference is coordinated through a newly established directorate within the Presidential Administration in Moscow and the activities of pro-Russian networks inside the country.

Political and economic pressures at home

Moldova is approaching its parliamentary elections in a challenging economic and political environment. Over the past four years, GDP growth has reached only 0.4 per cent, inflation is currently over 7 per cent, and the trade deficit for the first seven months of 2025 has surpassed $4 billion. The country remains economically vulnerable, reliant on external assistance and remittances from its diaspora. Despite formal progress in European integration – candidate status was granted in June 2022 and EU accession talks began in June 2024 – Moldova is still only at the early stage of reforms required for integration into the European political and economic space.

Moldovan society remains divided over the country’s overall geopolitical trajectory. Last year’s referendum on including a commitment to join the EU in the country’s constitution passed by a wafer-thin majority. A recent poll indicates that over 50% of Moldovans have a positive view of the EU against 14% who have a negative view, 31% described their position as ‘neutral’. Around 30% of voters were believed to be undecided in the immediate run-up to the election, creating a high degree of uncertainty about the result. However, polls indicated that the ruling party and pro-Russian opposition forces were neck and neck. According to a recent IRI poll, 49 per cent of respondents believe that Moldova is moving in the right direction, while 48 per cent say the opposite.

The Kremlin’s tools of influence

According to Bloomberg, in spring 2025 the Russian leadership approved a plan to interfere in Moldova’s parliamentary elections with the aim of weakening the position of the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) and President Maia Sandu. The plan includes bribing Moldovan citizens abroad, conducting a large-scale disinformation campaign, and organising protests. Moldova’s prime minister claimed earlier this year that Moscow spent around €200 million on interference in the 2024 presidential elections. Some observers believe that the amount could be even higher this time.

The Kremlin’s disinformation campaign in Moldova relies on a combination of domestic and external channels of influence. In several cases, destabilising narratives – Eurosceptic, anti-NATO, and supportive of unification between Moldova and Romania – are disseminated via Romanian media outlets such as ActiveNews, DCNews and Romania TV, and then ‘reintroduced’ into the Moldovan information space through social media and cross-platform reposting. These messages closely resemble those promoted by Sputnik Moldova and TASS. In effect, Russia uses Romania as a transit zone and amplifier, lending its propaganda the appearance of local origin.

The  campaign is reinforced by a well-organised domestic network supported by the resources of pro-Russian oligarch Ilan Shor. According to a BBC investigation, individuals linked to him oversee a web of fake accounts and use Russia’s Promsvyazbank to pay for content on TikTok and Facebook. These platforms are used to spread disinformation about alleged electoral fraud, an LGBT ‘threat’, and accusations against Maia Sandu. The network comprises around 90 accounts, which have collectively garnered over 55 million views.

The main narratives emphasise the perceived threat of ‘losing national identity’ and the ‘destruction of family values’ in the event of closer alignment with the EU. Economic difficulties are blamed on the government’s reforms and on European integration, while the leaders of PAS are systematically accused of corruption and other wrongdoing.

Moscow continues to use energy supplies as a lever of influence, although Moldova’s energy vulnerability has significantly decreased. In early 2025, following Ukraine’s refusal to extend the gas transit agreement, Gazprom halted the supply of Russian gas destined for Transnistria. While the right-bank part of Moldova – under the control of the central government – had ceased purchasing Russian gas back in 2022, it had continued to receive low-cost electricity produced by the Cuciurgan power station located in Transnistria.

The suspension of Russian gas deliveries triggered an energy crisis and led to the introduction of a temporary state of emergency. However, Moldova managed to offset the deficit through imports from Romania and electricity generation from other facilities, although electricity prices rose as a result.

Why Moldova matters to Moscow

For the Kremlin, Moldova remains part of its so‑called traditional sphere of influence. Within the Russian elite – particularly among the security establishment – the restoration of control over these territories is perceived as part of a historical mission to revive the imperial order. In the context of confrontation with the West, this aligns with the official narrative about the weakness of Western influence and serves to demonstrate Moscow’s ability to shift the balance of power on the EU’s periphery in its favour, as seen in Georgia following the victory of Georgian Dream in 2024.

In addition to its symbolic value, Moldova serves as an instrument of pressure on Ukraine. Approximately 1,500 Russian troops are currently stationed in Transnistria. According to Moldovan officials, Putin intends to increase the Transnistrian contingent to 10,000 troops. This is clearly not feasible while the border remains closed as a result of the war  in Ukraine.

Moldova is also of interest to Russia as a key transit hub for criminal and covert operations. According to investigations by OCCRP and RISE, several billion dollars from Russia were laundered through Moldovan banks via offshore schemes between 2010 and 2014. Transnistria is also used for smuggling goods and arms trafficking, reinforcing Russia’s grip on the region.

If  Moldova’s fragile socio-political and economic situation worsens after the elections, entrenched criminal networks are likely to find fresh opportunities to expand their influence. In these conditions, Moscow stands to benefit most, reinforcing its leverage through actors already woven into Moldova’s political and economic landscape.