Explaining recent personnel changes in Russia’s regional governments
Questions by Ben Noble, responses by Nikolai Petrov.
The Kremlin has recently replaced governors in the Belgorod and Bryansk regions, as well as the regional head of Dagestan.
In May, Alexander Shuvaev became acting governor of the Belgorod region, replacing Vyacheslav Gladkov; Yegor Kovalchuk became acting governor of the Bryansk region, replacing Alexander Bogomaz; and Fyodor Shchukin became acting head of Dagestan, replacing Sergei Melikov.
What’s going on?
The Kremlin is dissatisfied with how the dismissed officials performed under crisis conditions.
The resignations of the governors of the Belgorod and Bryansk regions were not unexpected: rumours of their replacement had been circulating for several weeks before Vladimir Putin formally announced the decision.
Gladkov – a technocratic governor who had acquired substantial public authority by effectively managing the war’s impact on a region that borders Ukraine – was until recently considered a likely candidate for promotion. Speculation linked him either to the post of head of the Presidential Administration’s Domestic Policy Directorate or to the leadership of the United Russia faction in the State Duma after the September 2026 elections.
Closer to his dismissal, however, expectations changed. He was instead rumoured to be under consideration for the post of Russian ambassador to Abkhazia – a clear demotion. So far, however, no new appointment has been announced.
Gladkov is believed to have damaged his standing with the Kremlin through his public criticism of internet restrictions, arguing that they complicated efforts to warn residents about drone attacks in his region.
In Bogomaz’s case, the Kremlin had previously expressed few complaints, and he was re-elected to a third gubernatorial term last year. However, as Ukrainian drone attacks intensified, Moscow appears to have concluded that the Bryansk region required stronger leadership.
It is also important to note the ongoing corruption investigations related to the construction of defensive fortifications in both regions, in which senior officials from Gladkov and Bogomaz’s teams have been implicated. In a related development, the former governor of the neighbouring Kursk region, Alexei Smirnov, has just been sentenced to 14 years in prison.
Regarding Dagestan, Melikov’s standing was damaged by his handling of several major crises. He performed poorly during the antisemitic unrest of 2023, when a mob stormed Makhachkala airport. He also came under criticism for his response to this year’s floods and severe weather-related disruptions.
Melikov’s dismissal had, therefore, been anticipated for a long time.
What do the profiles of those appointed as acting regional heads tell us?
Gladkov’s successor, Alexander Shuvaev, is a native of the Belgorod region, an army general, and a graduate of the Kremlin’s ‘Time of Heroes’ programme for veterans of the war against Ukraine.
Shuvaev is widely regarded as a protégé of Putin’s aide, Alexei Dyumin. His civilian administrative experience, however, is limited to a four-month stint as deputy governor of the Irkutsk region.
By appointing Shuvaev to replace an experienced and comparatively effective manager such as Gladkov, the Kremlin is taking a certain risk.
According to some reports, the Kremlin had little alternative, however, as no other viable candidates could be found for the governorship of a border region.
Meanwhile, Bogomaz’s replacement, Yegor Kovalchuk, is a former deputy governor of the Chelyabinsk region, who spent almost two years serving as prime minister of the so-called Luhansk People’s Republic.
On the one hand, Kovalchuk has experience working in several industrial regions, as well as within the federal government apparatus. On the other hand, his career trajectory illustrates the political advantages increasingly associated with service in the occupied territories. He is, in fact, the fifth Russian governor to emerge from the occupation administrations.
But the conditions of governance in the occupied territories differ substantially from those in Russia proper. The armed forces and the security services play a far greater role there, while disregard for legal norms has created fertile ground for large-scale corruption.
This experience has implications not only for elite recruitment but also for governance in Russia itself. Russian officials who serve in these territories subsequently bring back administrative practices and behavioural norms developed there. This contributes to what some observers describe as the ‘Donbasisation’ of Russia.
In Dagestan, Fyodor Shchukin’s appointment was rather unexpected. As an ethnic Russian and a civilian, he will likely occupy a symbolic role rather than exercising real control over the republic.
In practice, Magomed Ramazanov – the head of the government of Dagestan – will arguably wield real power.
Looking at the example of Shuvaev, can we say that ‘Time of Heroes’ graduates are finally taking up meaningful posts across the country?
No.
Despite Putin’s repeated statements about promoting war veterans to senior administrative positions – including at his 22 May meeting with the first cohort of graduates of the ‘Time of Heroes’ programme – it would be premature to say that this is being done on a large scale.
Many regions have launched their own programmes modelled on the federal initiative, and, in some cases, special posts responsible for 'military-patriotic work' have been created specifically for programme graduates.
But there has so far been little meaningful recruitment of veterans for significant administrative roles.
At the same time, many ambitious officials from both the executive and legislative branches have undertaken short-term military service – typically lasting between three and six months – in specially designated units operating under relatively safe conditions. This allows them to obtain veteran status and, upon returning to civilian life, improve their prospects for career advancement.
What do these personnel changes tell us about the Kremlin’s perceptions of the war against Ukraine?
These recent regional changes are part of a broader promotion of a ‘new elite’ composed of military veterans of the war against Ukraine and officials who have served in the occupied territories.
The changes also reflect the Kremlin’s expectation that the war will be prolonged.
The Kremlin generally seeks to minimise reshuffles among the regional governors in order to avoid creating additional political and administrative instability. Yet, over the past one to two years, nearly all the border regions – including Belgorod, Bryansk, Kursk, and Rostov – have seen changes in leadership. The Kursk region alone has already had two governors replaced during this period.
At the same time, service in the occupied territories increasingly functions as a career accelerator for Russian officials. Gladkov himself, for example, previously worked in Sevastopol after the annexation of Crimea.
By contrast, dismissals of governors are becoming increasingly harsh and punitive, reflecting the Kremlin’s growing intolerance of perceived administrative failures under wartime conditions.