Might makes right: How Maduro’s capture has affected Moscow’s position
'Operation Absolute Resolve' has dealt another blow to Russia’s reputation, highlighting the Kremlin’s limited effectiveness as a military and political actor. At the same time, the Kremlin is likely to view the outcome in broadly positive terms, as the key result was not the loss of an ally but the consolidation of a new logic in US foreign policy under the Trump administration – one that prioritises force and national interests over international law. This, in turn, will help the Kremlin justify its policies towards Ukraine and other post-Soviet states, although within this revived old world order, Russia’s position appears less convincing and far more modest than the ambitions it publicly proclaims.
Military and political costs
Moscow’s official response to the US military operation in Venezuela and the seizure of Nicolás Maduro was restrained. Russia’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Vasily Nebenzya, described the US actions as ‘an act of banditry’ and stated that Moscow condemns armed intervention against Venezuela. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs characterised the events as an ‘act of armed aggression’, while limiting itself to an expression of ‘deep concern’. Former President Dmitry Medvedev launched another tirade, while nonetheless acknowledging President Trump’s consistency in defending US interests. Against this backdrop, the complete absence of public comment from Vladimir Putin is particularly notable.
From a military perspective, the US operation once again highlighted the ineffectiveness of Russian air defence systems, which formed the backbone of Caracas’s air defence, and, more broadly, the technological limitations of the weapons Russia supplies to its allies.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), between 2008 and 2014 Russia supplied Venezuela with three already outdated Buk-M2 surface-to-air missile systems, three S-300VM Antey-2500 systems, and 11 modernised S-125 Pechora-2M systems. In one of the most recent deliveries, Russia also transferred additional Pantsir-S1 self-propelled air defence systems and Buk-M2 systems. However, by the time the US operation began on 3 January 2026, a significant share of Venezuela’s air defence was non-operational, in particular due to poor maintenance and shortages of spare parts – including as a result of Russia’s failure to fulfil its obligations on repair and modernisation.
Moreover, the fifth-generation F-35 and F-22 fighter jets used by the United States proved capable of penetrating air defence systems, including Russian ones. The US also deployed advanced electronic warfare systems, which helped to secure Venezuelan airspace for the use of helicopters.
The capture of Maduro and his subsequent trial in the United States are perceived in the Kremlin as a reputational blow: Moscow did not come to the aid of its ally, despite having every reason to anticipate such a development.1
The successful US operation has triggered high levels of frustration among hardline militarists in Russia. Military correspondents and pro-war commentators lament Russia’s inability to protect Maduro, while criticising the Ministry of Defence’s personnel decisions more harshly than usual, and drawing uncomfortable parallels between the swift and effective US operation and Russia’s protracted war against Ukraine.
The critical tone adopted by Russian militarists towards the army leadership, the senior bureaucracy, and Putin personally has shifted to an openly hostile one. In terms of intensity, criticism of the regime voiced by active supporters of the war on social media is approaching the levels taken by liberal online media during the 2011–2012 protests. It is reasonable to believe that the audience for these critics is no smaller: according to various surveys, between 25 and 37 per cent of respondents oppose peace negotiations even now, at a time when official propaganda publicly affirms the government’s commitment to a peaceful resolution of the conflict.
Ella Paneyakh
Head of Sociology, NEST Centre
The situation surrounding Maduro is not an exception and fits into a broader pattern of recent cases in which the Kremlin has refrained from active engagement in crises involving its allies, including in Syria.
At the same time, Moscow may use the Venezuelan example to promote its influence in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, advancing the narrative that the United States and its allies cannot be trusted and presenting itself as a defender of sovereignty, albeit a weak one. This could potentially enhance Russia’s political weight in parts of the Global South.
Limited economic risks
From an economic perspective, Maduro’s removal does not entail significant losses for Moscow and, in the short and medium term, appears largely neutral, while in some respects even reducing risks – even if Washington were to compel the regime to sever economic ties with Russia.
Despite decades of cooperation, Venezuela has never been a major economic partner for Russia. Bilateral trade amounted to around USD 200 million in 2024.2 By comparison, Russia’s trade with China reached USD 245 billion over the same period.
The economic returns for Moscow from Venezuelan oil are now minimal. Until 2020, the state oil company Rosneft operated in the Venezuelan market, when it transferred its assets to state-owned Roszarubezhneft.3 The scale of Russia’s oil business in Venezuela has since declined and is now well below the levels seen 10–15 years ago. Further support for Venezuela’s oil sector would require additional investment from Russia, for which the Kremlin lacks the necessary resources.
Between 2006 and 2019, Moscow extended at least USD 17 billion in loans and credit lines to Caracas, on which Venezuela has long ceased making payments, as it has on its other external obligations. The disappearance of a chronically loss-making partner reduces Moscow’s future liabilities: Russia no longer needs to expand military and financial support for Venezuela, nor does it have to invest in the maintenance of weapons which it has supplied and the related infrastructure.
The only potential risk which Moscow may associate with the situation in Venezuela concerns global oil prices. In the long term, the restoration of Venezuela’s oil sector under US control could, in theory, increase global oil supply and put downward pressure on prices, which would negatively affect Russia’s oil revenues. Donald Trump has already predicted a decline in prices to USD 50 per barrel, arguing that a USD 10 drop in global prices could force Moscow to halt military operations in Ukraine.
However, rebuilding Venezuela’s oil industry will require time and substantial investment, and will depend on reform of the sanctions regime and the maintenance of political stability. The United States also has little interest in a sharp collapse in oil prices, as a global price drop would primarily hit US shale oil production. In any case, Russia is, to some extent, shielded from the risk of lower prices by its rouble-denominated budget structure, which allows part of the price decline to be offset through a weakening of the rouble.
‘Might makes right’ as the new normal
Against the backdrop of reputational and economic losses, the Kremlin has reason, on balance, to be satisfied with recent developments: through his actions, Trump has, in effect, endorsed a model of world order in which force takes precedence over international law. This lowers the political cost of the war in Ukraine and expands Moscow’s room for manoeuvre in Europe.
The US president’s actions have confirmed Washington’s intention to adhere to the principles set out in the new US National Security Strategy, which once again designates the Western Hemisphere as a zone of special US interests and treats the presence of external actors there as hostile. In this framework, international law gives way to the logic of power and interests.
Moscow has no objections of principle to this logic and has previously signalled its readiness to accept it – provided that Russia receives recognition of comparable rights in Eastern Europe and across the post-Soviet space.
During Trump’s first presidential term, Moscow informally proposed that Washington withdraw from Venezuela in exchange for a US withdrawal from Ukraine. According to Fiona Hill, then the US National Security Council’s Senior Director for Europe and Russia, such proposals were conveyed through comments and publications in the press, but the underlying logic was clear: if the United States considers it acceptable to defend its influence in neighbouring regions, Russia should have the right to do the same.
In this sense, the US operation in Venezuela provides the Kremlin with a convenient justification for the use of force in pursuit of its own interests – above all in the war against Ukraine. In addition, it may strengthen Moscow’s ambitions regarding the post-war settlement, including demands for power in Kyiv to be transferred to figures acceptable to the Kremlin.
Meanwhile, statements from the White House about the possible annexation of Greenland have heightened tensions within the transatlantic space. Such a takeover would benefit Russia not only by diverting Washington’s attention away from Ukraine, but also because US aggression against an ally would undermine the cohesion of NATO and destroy what remains of the post-Cold War European security architecture.
At the same time, a substantial increase in the US military presence in Greenland would pose direct risks to Russian interests in the Arctic, while a clear delineation of spheres of influence with Washington in this region would not be straightforward.
Ultimately, the ‘Monroe Doctrine’ reinforces the model of world order which the Kremlin seeks – a world defined by force, spheres of influence, and weakened alliances – making the question of Europe’s ability to ensure its own security even more acute.