Muted dissatisfaction: Russians are increasingly critical of the government’s economic policy
The beginning of 2026 marked a turning point in Russia’s economic trajectory. The steady growth of around 4 per cent per year, which began in mid-2023, gave way to stagnation and, to some extent, even decline. This shift is bound to affect Russians’ living standards. However, official statistics do not allow for an adequate assessment of its impact, as they do not provide data on changes in living standards broken down by place of residence, income level, or age. To help address this gap, the NEST Centre is conducting a series of its own surveys in Russia. The first two took place in February and April 2026 and focused on perceptions of the economic situation and the government’s performance.
The survey results show that Russians are generally dissatisfied with the state of the economy and the government’s economic policy. At the same time, this dissatisfaction is not giving rise to protest. Moderately negative views predominate, while the share of strongly negative assessments remains limited. Overall, public perceptions of the economy are comparable to those observed during the COVID-19 pandemic and the period of the 2018 pension reform.
Growing dissatisfaction and safe responses
Almost half of the respondents (between 40 and 50 per cent across different groups) described the state of the Russian economy as ‘so-so’. Most of the rest assessed it as generally good. Positive and negative assessments were distributed in roughly a 60:40 ratio.
The most favourable assessments of the state of the economy came from respondents aged 18–24 (positive-to-negative ratio of 82:18), residents of Moscow (67:33), higher-income respondents (74:26), and consumers of traditional media (television, radio, and newspapers). The least favourable assessments came from respondents with a low standard of living (34:66), those aged 45–65 (55:45), and viewers of YouTube channels (33:67).
Respondents were more negative when assessing changes in the economy over the previous three months. 37 per cent believed the situation had not changed, while 18 per cent were convinced it had improved somewhat or significantly. By contrast, 36 per cent believed that it had deteriorated somewhat or significantly.
Views across different demographic groups followed broadly the same pattern as assessments of the economy’s overall condition. Younger respondents, Muscovites, higher-income individuals, and audiences of state media tended to hold more positive views. Less affluent respondents, those aged 45–65, and viewers of YouTube channels tended to hold more negative views.
Surveys did not reveal strong criticism of the government’s economic priorities among Russians. By a margin of 59:41, respondents judged the Russian government’s economic policy priorities to be either entirely or mostly correct rather than entirely or mostly incorrect. 19 per cent were unable to answer.
These assessments stand in marked contrast to respondents’ evaluations of the government’s actual performance. When asked, ‘Do you think the Russian government’s economic policies create more problems, or do they bring substantial positive results?’, respondents gave considerably more negative assessments.
Among those willing to provide an opinion (81 per cent of respondents), 40 per cent chose the answer that ‘the government’s economic policies create more problems, with few positive results’. A further 41 per cent selected the moderately negative option that they ‘create some problems, which will be offset by positive changes in the future’. Only 19 per cent believed that the government’s policies ‘bring substantial positive results, with only a few problems’.
As with other questions, younger respondents (by a ratio of 71:29), residents of Moscow (64:36), and consumers of traditional media expressed considerably more positive views. The most negative assessments once again came from respondents with low incomes (45% positive to 55% negative). They were the only group in which negative evaluations predominated in responses to this question.
This divergence between assessments of the authorities’ intentions and priorities, on the one hand, and the results of their economic policy, on the other, can be explained in two ways. Firstly, respondents may believe that the government is choosing the right objectives but is unable to achieve them. Secondly, it is entirely possible that some respondents chose what they thought of as the ‘correct answer’ to an overly direct question, a pattern often observed in Russian surveys. Responses to subsequent questions in the survey point towards the latter explanation.
When the discussion shifts to the impact of government policies on respondents’ personal circumstances, the share of those unable to provide an answer falls to just 5 per cent, while assessments of the government become noticeably more critical. The ratio of respondents who believe that the government ‘creates new problems [for them and their families]’ to those who believe that the authorities ‘help to solve economic problems’ is 7:3.
At the same time, it should be noted that more than half of those who expressed an opinion (51 per cent) stated that government policies ‘do not affect the quality of life’ of their families in any way.
The only group more likely to have a positive than a negative view of the impact of government policies on their family’s economic problems was young people aged 18–24 (by 52% to 48%). The most negative assessments came from respondents with low incomes and those aged 45–65, among whom the ratio of positive to negative responses was 20:80. Muscovites, who were relatively optimistic on other questions, assessed the government’s policies just as negatively as the overall sample in this case (by 28% to 72%).
The wealthy are more loyal, the poor more critical
Better-off Russians tend to assess the authorities’ economic policies more positively. Among respondents who could afford an unexpected expense of 40,000 roubles (approximately US$533), 27 per cent said that the government helps them to address their families’ economic problems, while 20 per cent believed that the authorities create new problems for their families.
Among respondents whose savings would not cover such an expense, the corresponding figures were 8 per cent and 37 per cent, respectively.
The share of respondents who believed that government policies have no impact on addressing their families’ problems was broadly similar across all groups, ranging from 47 to 52 per cent.
The survey data support the well-established argument that inflation affects lower-income groups far more severely. Although inflation in Russia has been declining gradually over the past two years, only 16 per cent of respondents who identified the high cost of living as a problem believe that the government is dealing with it successfully (‘completely’ or ‘mostly successful’). By contrast, 75 per cent assess the government’s management of inflation negatively (‘completely’ or ‘mostly unsuccessful’).
Among respondents who are not concerned about the cost of living, 68 per cent assess the government’s performance positively, while 21 per cent do so negatively.
The intermediate response categories – ‘financial difficulties create a limited burden’ and ‘there are no problems at present, but they may arise if the cost of living continues to increase’ – account for 35 per cent and 54 per cent of respondents, respectively. Just under a quarter of respondents (24 per cent) assess the authorities’ performance in curbing inflation very negatively. This is an unusually low figure, given that rising prices have traditionally been the issue of greatest concern to Russians. In the most recent Levada Centre surveys on the subject, 58 per cent of respondents identified inflation as the most acute problem facing the country.
The distribution of responses when assessing the government’s success in addressing broader economic problems, combatting inflation, and improving the healthcare and education systems was remarkably similar. Questions concerning the government’s overall economic performance, inflation, and the development of education were characterised by a relatively high share of respondents who were unable to provide an answer (19 per cent). This is likely because respondents do not directly encounter problems in these areas, unlike issues affecting their families or the healthcare system.
Discomfort without protest
The survey results indicate that Russians are experiencing some discomfort due to the deterioration of the overall economic situation, and do not regard the government’s policy in this area as successful. At the same time, their overall level of concern remains relatively low, and their responses do not point to a rise in opposition to the regime.
A long-running series of surveys conducted by the Levada Centre shows a sharp decline in assessments of Russia’s economic situation at the end of last year (the most recent survey was carried out in January 2026). The decline is comparable to that observed during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, by historical standards – for example, compared with the period from 2000 to 2020, let alone the 1990s – Russians’ assessment of the economy remains relatively high.
Another series of surveys, conducted by VTsIOM, shows a substantial decline in assessments of the authorities’ economic policy, comparable to the second half of 2018, when the increase in the pension age was announced. Yet, once again, the absolute level of these assessments remains high by historical standards.
It can be stated with a high degree of confidence that the Russian economy has not yet reached the lowest point of its current trajectory. At present, there are no signs of an economic recovery. The situation is likely to deteriorate gradually; economic difficulties will become increasingly noticeable to the population, and this will probably be reflected in public opinion.
Methodology
The nationwide surveys were conducted during the final ten days of February and April 2026 using a representative sample of Russia’s urban and rural population. The sample comprised 1,604 respondents aged 18 and over across 137 localities in 50 federal subjects of the Russian Federation.
The surveys were conducted through face-to-face interviews. The dataset was weighted by gender, age, and level of education for each locality type (large cities, medium-sized cities, small towns, and rural areas) within each federal district separately, in accordance with Rosstat data.
The margin of error for a sample of 1,600 respondents, at a 95 per cent confidence level, does not exceed:
- 3.4 per cent for indicators close to 50 per cent;
- 2.9 per cent for indicators close to 25 per cent / 75 per cent;
- 2.0 per cent for indicators close to 10 per cent / 90 per cent;
- 1.5 per cent for indicators close to 5 per cent / 95 per cent.