Playing the arms race game: Russia’s post-New START calculus
The expiry of the New START treaty has, for the first time in decades, left the United States and Russia without formal limits on strategic nuclear weapons. Although Moscow tries to create the impression of readiness for a large-scale arms race, it has little interest in pursuing one. The Kremlin’s strategy is aimed at preserving the status quo and slowing US nuclear modernisation. Vladimir Putin’s offer to extend the caps on the treaty’s deployment limits for an additional year reflects a pragmatic attempt to buy time and extract political advantages from the absence of a binding agreement at a moment when the escalation logic set in motion by Moscow is beginning to work against it.
The end of New START
On 5 February 2026, the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START) expired. It was the last agreement providing mutual US–Russian control over strategic nuclear arsenals. Signed in 2010 and extended for five years in 2021, the treaty set ceilings on strategic forces and provided for data exchanges, site visits and reciprocal inspections of nuclear missiles.
The COVID-19 pandemic led to the temporary suspension of New START inspections. In fact, these never resumed. In February 2023, Russia announced the suspension of its participation in the treaty, withdrawing from the bilateral inspection mechanism, and sharply reducing data exchanges. As a result, mutual treaty-based control was replaced by unilateral national means of monitoring and analytical assessments, primarily satellite and signals intelligence. This significantly reduced transparency and predictability, increasing the role of assumptions and worst-case scenarios in strategic planning.
In autumn 2025, Putin stated that Moscow was prepared to adhere to New START provisions for at least one year after the treaty’s expiry, provided the United States made reciprocal commitments. Less than a week ago, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov confirmed that the offer remains in force and that Russia is still awaiting a response from Washington.
The United States, for its part, is promoting the idea of a new nuclear arms agreement with mandatory participation by China. According to US intelligence assessments, China’s arsenal is approaching 600 warheads and could exceed 1,000 by 2030. China, however, remains far behind the United States and Russia, which together account for around 86 per cent of the world’s nuclear weapons, and therefore has little incentive to accept constraints before reaching a comparable level.
Russia, in turn, insists that the nuclear capabilities of the United Kingdom and France be taken into account when defining the parameters of any future arms control regime. Moscow does not demand their direct participation in negotiations but believes that these arsenals must be included in the overall ‘nuclear equation’. The United States is not prepared to accept this approach, as it would alter the strategic balance in Russia’s favour.
Disagreements over participants and parameters significantly complicate the negotiating configuration and effectively block the conclusion of a new treaty in the foreseeable future. This may help explain why the US position may be shifting. There are indications that Washington may be willing to continue observing New START limits as proposed by Putin.
Moscow’s position on strategic weapons
Russia’s initiative is not aimed at restoring a full-fledged strategic arms control regime and does not envisage the resumption of inspections, expanded data exchanges, or the conclusion of a new legally binding agreement. The Kremlin’s insistence on voluntary compliance with quantitative limits reflects an effort to selectively preserve the favourable elements of the previous regime and to lock in a balance of strategic forces advantageous to Russia in the medium term.
By early 2026, Russia had made substantial progress in modernising key elements of its nuclear triad. The United States, by contrast, is only entering a phase of large-scale and costly modernisation of its strategic forces. A significant share of US nuclear infrastructure and delivery systems was commissioned several decades ago and requires comprehensive replacement. Washington is only beginning to roll out a comprehensive modernisation programme, with costs estimated at USD 90–100 billion per year over several decades.
In this context, maintaining the quantitative limits set by New START helps to freeze the current balance at a moment when the United States has not yet realised its modernisation potential. New START does not directly impede US strategic modernisation, but it reduces the political and institutional incentives for an accelerated expansion of deployed forces beyond the established ceilings. In the absence of a treaty framework, arguments for a sharp increase in US nuclear spending would gain additional weight. According to the Congressional Budget Office, around USD 946 billion could be allocated over the next ten years to sustain and modernise US nuclear forces, with the final level of expenditure remaining sensitive to changes in the strategic context.
For Russia, participation in a full-scale nuclear arms race with the United States is economically disadvantageous. The Russian budget is under sustained pressure, and the structure of the economy limits the scope for rapid and resource-intensive expansion of strategic programmes. Even a potential end to the war against Ukraine would not free resources comparable to the United States’ financial and technological capabilities in the nuclear domain. Preserving limits therefore reduces the risk of an asymmetrical race in which Moscow would be in a more vulnerable position.
An additional factor is the impact of strategic arms control on US allies in Europe. A complete dismantling of bilateral constraints would increase strategic uncertainty in Europe and could accelerate the growth of defence spending, including in the nuclear sphere. From the Kremlin’s perspective, rising budgetary pressure and domestic political debates within European states would be a secondary but favourable effect. As the US military presence in Europe declines, the doctrine of extended deterrence is likely to be questioned more frequently, reinforcing perceptions of vulnerability in Europe, which the Kremlin will seek to exploit.
Finally, voluntary compliance with limits allows Russia to shift responsibility for the final dismantling of the strategic stability regime on to the United States. If Washington refuses to continue observing the limits, it will be the party that, de facto, abandons the last remaining element of bilateral control over strategic nuclear weapons.