Russia–Ukraine memorandum: is Putin serious about making concessions?

Negotiations between Russia and Ukraine have begun to move forward, though their outcome remains far from certain. Last week’s meeting between the Ukrainian and Russian delegations in Istanbul, followed by Monday’s phone conversation between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, marked limited but real progress - measured simply by the resumption of dialogue

The phone calls between Trump and Putin (three have officially taken place since Trump’s return to the White House) have paved the way for further direct contacts between Moscow and Kyiv and the possibility of a US-Russia summit. The dialogue between the two presidents has led to both Ukraine and Russia retreating from opening positions that were unacceptable for the other - a ‘ceasefire without conditions’ as proposed by Ukraine and ‘no ceasefire without a peace agreement’ as tabled by Russia.

How Putin took control of the talks with Trump

The discussions between Putin and Trump have split into two tracks: one concerning Ukraine, the other – bilateral US–Russia relations. In both cases, the Kremlin has managed to steer the dynamics in a favourable direction on several key issues:

• Breaking out of international isolation. The phone calls with Trump enabled Putin to re-enter the broader geopolitical arena. Their discussions covered not only the war in Ukraine but also other sensitive topics, including Iran and a wider range of global issues.
• Marginalisation of Europe. Europe has been effectively pushed to the margins of the negotiation process. At present, Washington is seen by the Kremlin as the only meaningful negotiating counterparty. Putin is counting on the United States to make use of its stronger geopolitical position in the talks to impose on its European allies any agreements reached.
• Demonstration of readiness for dialogue. Putin succeeded in convincing Trump that Moscow is open to substantive negotiations with Ukraine. The Kremlin has shifted from harsh rhetoric and blatantly unrealistic demands to a more restrained and constructive tone. Instead of continuing to refer to the need to return to the framework of the Istanbul talks in 2022 when Russia tried to force Ukraine to surrender at the start of the war, Putin has now for the first time referred to the need for mutual compromise.
• Reduced pressure from the United States. The risk of new US sanctions against Russia has diminished, and it appears that arms deliveries to Ukraine will be limited to volumes previously approved by the Biden administration.

For Moscow, the catalyst for progress in the peace process was Donald Trump’s acceptance of Russia’s insistence on settling the political outcome of the war (what Putin describes as ‘the principles of a settlement’) before a ceasefire is in place.

Framing the outcome of the war as ‘victory’

Russian society interpret these developments as a partial normalisation of relations with the West. For now, expectations of an imminent ‘victory’ continue to underpin high levels of public support for the war. However, once fighting ceases, those sentiments may quickly reverse. 

The Kremlin’s next steps are likely to focus on agreeing with Ukraine the political ‘memorandum’ proposed by Putin that formalises Russia’s symbolic gains and, in parallel, a ceasefire. Domestically, this ‘memorandum’ could be presented as an outcome of the war that justifies the price paid by society. Potential elements of an agreement that would allow the Kremlin to frame the war’s outcome as a ‘victory’ might include:

• A ceasefire along the current line of contact – interpreted as the ‘protection of the Russian-speaking population’;
• Informal guarantees on limiting deliveries of certain types of weaponry to Ukraine, especially long-range systems – an example of the successful ‘demilitarisation’ of Ukraine;
• A block on NATO membership for Ukraine – a demand that now appears to have been achieved given the current US position;
• Restoration of the institutional presence of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in Ukraine – as a symbolic substitute for the Kremlin’s fictitious demand for ‘denazification’. Since 2022, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (operating under the canonical jurisdiction of the ROC) has faced large-scale delegitimisation within Ukraine leading to a ban on its activities in 2024. The reinstatement of ROC structures could be used by the Kremlin as a less toxic alternative to ‘denazification’. Domestically, such a concession could be framed as ‘defending Orthodoxy’ and ‘restoring traditional values’ in Ukraine – without requiring any real restructuring of Ukrainian institutions.

Nevertheless, the framework of a potential peace agreement remains undefined and will likely be the subject of intense bargaining. Putin continues to take a hard line on the recognition of Russian territorial gains and appears willing to discuss concessions in this area only in exchange for meaningful strategic guarantees.

Temporary peace?

The central question for the continuation of the negotiation process is whether both sides can see the possibility of a settlement that neither can regard as a defeat? Given the high domestic political cost of concessions for both Kyiv and Moscow, any realistic compromise is likely to be presented as a ‘temporary arrangement’.

Putin sees the current situation as favourable: the West is divided, the Russian army has the initiative on the battlefield, and domestic resources have not yet been exhausted. In the coming weeks, the Kremlin might launch a limited offensive on one of the Ukrainian fronts – not to achieve a strategic breakthrough, but to strengthen its negotiating position.

At the same time, Putin risks overestimating his temporary advantages. If, emboldened by tactical successes, he attempts to revert to a peace settlement based on ultimatums as tried in 2022, the recent progress could unravel and the dialogue might collapse. 

For now, the Kremlin is happy to keep up  the image of a constructive negotiating party, while continuing to seek gains on the battlefield.