A pause in the gloom: Russians’ economic sentiment improves
After several months of declining economic sentiment, Russians have begun to assess the state of the economy somewhat more positively. According to a new NEST Centre survey conducted in late October, the share of positive assessments rose from 22 to 28 per cent compared with August, while the share of negative assessments fell from 21 to 19 per cent. However, it is too early to speak of a sustained improvement in economic sentiment: the October figures have merely returned to the levels recorded in February and April. One possible explanation is the easing of the fuel crisis following the completion of the harvest, and the partial restoration of oil refining capacity after refineries were damaged by Ukrainian strikes. Another explanation is that the absence of further deterioration is perceived as an improvement.
Across the sample, the overall share who gave positive assessments was 9 percentage points higher than the share who gave negative assessments. However, optimism was notably higher among those who obtain information from traditional media and the MAX messaging app,1 with positive assessments outnumbering negative ones by 20 to 43 percentage points. By contrast, negative assessments outnumbered positive ones among respondents who consider themselves to be on low incomes, entrepreneurs and managers, and those who do not trust any media outlets (18 per cent of respondents).
The assumption that the improvement in assessments of the economy is linked to the easing of the petrol crisis is supported by respondents’ answers to a question about whether the state of the Russian economy had improved or deteriorated over the previous three months. Although the share of those who believed that the situation had improved (‘improved significantly’ or ‘improved somewhat’) remained virtually unchanged compared with August (16 per cent against 15 per cent), the share of those giving negative assessments (‘deteriorated significantly’ or ‘deteriorated somewhat’) fell from 43 to 35 per cent.
Residents of Moscow, those who obtain information from traditional media, and respondents who consider themselves well-off were particularly optimistic in their assessments of changes in the economic situation over recent months. Across the sample, the overall share saying the economy had worsened was 19 points larger than the share saying it had improved, but among these groups of respondents, it was only 10 percentage points larger. Respondents with higher education, young people aged 18–24, entrepreneurs, those on low incomes, and those who prefer to obtain information from the internet gave significantly more negative assessments of recent changes in the economic situation, with a difference of around minus 30 percentage points.
An interesting finding emerged from the survey responses to questions about the impact of the war (referred to in the survey as the ‘special military operation’) on the Russian economy and on respondents’ household finances. Responses to the first question showed no significant differences from the June and August surveys – three-quarters of respondents still believe that the war is damaging the economy. Responses to the second question showed that more than half of Russians (54 per cent) believe that the war and the associated changes in the economy have had no impact on their household finances. Another 39 per cent reported that their financial situation had deteriorated to some extent, while 4 per cent found it difficult to answer the question. Only 3 per cent reported an improvement in their household finances.
At first glance, this figure appears low – the families of those fighting in the war (2.5–3 million people), employees of defence enterprises (almost 4 million), and other beneficiaries of the war might have given more positive assessments.
The results were probably influenced by the survey’s sampling method. A large share of those who enlist in the army on contracts live in small towns and rural areas that interviewers do not reach. Defence industry enterprises are often located in isolated areas of major cities, and their employees rarely agree to take part in surveys for fear of being accused of disclosing state secrets.
It is also reasonable to assume that a habituation effect is at work: the war has been going on for almost five years, and the sharp increase in living standards among defence industry workers and the families of contract soldiers is now in the past.
An example of how subjective perceptions do not always correspond to objective conditions can be found in the responses to this question from older respondents (aged 65 and over) and pensioners – just over a third of them (34–35 per cent) reported a deterioration in their financial situation. At the same time, since the start of the war, pension increases have lagged significantly behind rising prices, utility tariffs, and overall household incomes. This objectively indicates a decline in both the absolute and relative living standards of this group of Russians. However, in this case, it appears that the influence of state media outweighs that of survey respondents’ own bank balances: they do not perceive any deterioration in their situation.
Methodology
The nationwide survey was conducted through face-to-face interviews during the final ten days of October 2026 using a representative sample of Russia’s urban and rural population. The sample comprised 1,603 respondents aged 18 and over. The margin of error for a sample, at a 95 per cent confidence level, does not exceed:
- 3.4 per cent for indicators close to 50 per cent;
- 2.9 per cent for indicators close to 25 per cent / 75 per cent;
- 2.0 per cent for indicators close to 10 per cent / 90 per cent;
- 1.5 per cent for indicators close to 5 per cent / 95 per cent.