Welfare, not warfare: Russians tolerate inflation, unless it finances the war



An October survey by the NEST Centre showed that Russians are more willing to accept rising prices than higher taxes as a way of increasing government spending. However, Russians are prepared to accept inflation only if the additional government spending is directed towards supporting citizens rather than funding the war. More than half of respondents opposed financing military expenditure through inflation.


When Russians are asked about the main problems that concern them, rising prices rank first by a wide margin. In all surveys conducted by the Levada Centre, for example, the share of respondents citing this problem has never fallen below 50 per cent throughout the period covered by the surveys.1 Such a consistently high level of concern about inflation is unprecedented even in countries such as Turkey and Argentina, where inflation rates were often higher than in Russia between 2000 and 2025.2

Federal budget expenditure has recently been the main driver of inflation in Russia. Rising military spending consumes a significant share of the state’s resources, while the government has to accept a higher budget deficit in order to finance non-military expenditure. Financing this deficit increases inflationary pressure on the economy. The survey conducted in October assessed Russians’ willingness to accept inflation as a condition for increasing different categories of government spending.

Respondents were first asked to make a choice that governments in many countries regularly face: which is the better way to finance additional government spending – by raising taxes or by increasing the budget deficit, which would lead to higher inflation? A plurality of respondents (38 per cent) found it difficult to answer this question. Those in favour of raising taxes (‘definitely raise’ and ‘probably raise’) were in the minority (27 per cent). These responses may be related to the increase in the VAT rate at the beginning of the year, which led to higher prices and an unscheduled increase in utility tariffs. 35 per cent of respondents favoured inflationary financing of additional government spending.

There were no significant differences in responses to this question between those who approve of Vladimir Putin’s policies and those who disapprove, between those who believe the country is moving in the right direction and those who believe it is moving in the wrong direction, or between respondents with different levels of wealth.

A clear predominance of support for raising taxes was recorded among respondents living in Moscow and the Russian Far East, as well as among those who trust radio and print media more than other sources of information. Among these groups, the share supporting higher taxes was 6–13 percentage points larger than the share favouring a higher budget deficit and inflation. Opinions were roughly evenly divided among respondents who use the MAX messaging app or rely on friends and acquaintances for information. Support for financing additional spending through a higher budget deficit was notably stronger among respondents who place the greatest trust in online sources of information, Russians aged 25–34, respondents with secondary education, and residents of southern Russia and Siberia. Among these groups, supporters of a higher deficit and inflation outnumbered supporters of higher taxes by 16–30 percentage points.

Respondents’ attitudes towards the acceptability of inflation changed significantly when they were asked whether the state should support citizens in difficult economic circumstances, even if this required higher government spending (which would accelerate inflation), or whether citizens should rely on their own resources. An overwhelming majority of respondents chose the first option (39 per cent ‘definitely’ and 29 per cent ‘probably’). The share of those who believed that citizens should take responsibility for their own welfare was below 20 per cent (4 per cent ‘definitely’ and 15 per cent ‘probably’). Paternalistic attitudes were stronger among those who disapprove of Vladimir Putin’s policies or who believe that the country is moving in the wrong direction, as well as among younger respondents (aged 18–24).

While respondents supported the idea of financing government spending through inflation if it was aimed at supporting citizens, they did not approve of using this approach to finance higher military expenditure. More than half of respondents opposed this policy (31 per cent ‘definitely against’ and 23 per cent ‘probably against’). Around a third were prepared to accept it (10 per cent ‘definitely in favour’ and 22 per cent ‘probably in favour’). The percentage who support the financing of the war through inflation did not exceed the percentage who oppose it in any group of respondents except Russians aged 65 and over, among whom supporters outnumbered opponents by one percentage point. Among those who trust television, radio, and the MAX messaging app, the share supporting the financing of the war through inflation was only 2–4 percentage points lower than the share opposing it.

The balance between supporters and opponents of inflationary financing of government spending varies depending on how respondents assess the state of the Russian economy.

Those who assess Russia’s economic situation as good are more likely than those who assess it as poor to support this policy when it is used to finance military expenditure. By contrast, respondents who assess the state of the economy as poor are prepared to accept inflation if the government increases spending on support for citizens, but do not want inflation to be the price of the war.

Methodology

The nationwide survey was conducted through face-to-face interviews during the final ten days of October 2026 using a representative sample of Russia’s urban and rural population. The sample comprised 1,603 respondents aged 18 and over. The margin of error for a sample, at a 95 per cent confidence level, does not exceed:

  • 3.4 per cent for indicators close to 50 per cent;
  • 2.9 per cent for indicators close to 25 per cent / 75 per cent;
  • 2.0 per cent for indicators close to 10 per cent / 90 per cent;
  • 1.5 per cent for indicators close to 5 per cent / 95 per cent.

Endnotes

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of the NEST Centre.