The Israel-Iran conflict has exposed the limits of Russia’s influence in the Middle East

Moscow is seeking to position itself as a neutral mediator in the emerging conflict between Iran and Israel. The Russian leadership views the escalation as a potential window of opportunity to expand its geopolitical presence in the region, shift the balance of power, and divert Western attention away from Ukraine. However, the lack of meaningful leverage over either Tehran or Tel Aviv makes this scenario unlikely. Moscow will either confine itself to informal technical cooperation with Iran or adopt a strategy of being a distant observer.

Russia’s interests in Iran: oil, arms, and diplomacy

Under continued Western sanctions, Iran and Russia have gradually formed a stable strategic partnership. Their agreement on comprehensive strategic cooperation, signed in January 2025 and ratified by Iran two days before Israel launched mass airstrikes against the Islamic Republic, covers a range of issues – from defence industry and energy to scientific cooperation and cultural exchange. Yet unlike Russia’s 2024  treaty with North Korea, it does not include mutual military obligations in the event of armed conflict.

In the context of the Iran–Israel conflict, Russia’s sole obligation is to refrain from supporting Israel – something that would have been unlikely even without the agreement. While the Kremlin is clearly unwilling to engage militarily on Tehran’s side, Iran remains a key regional partner through which Moscow advances several strategic objectives. The Iran–Israel escalation presents significant risks for Russia: regional destabilisation could jeopardise joint infrastructure and energy projects, restrict transit through Iran, and further undermine Russia’s influence in the region after the fall of the Assad regime.

Drone production. One of the core areas of Russian–Iranian cooperation is defence industrial production, particularly the joint assembly of strike UAVs. Since summer 2023, Russia has been producing Shahed-136 drones based on Iranian designs and technical documentation at a facility in the ‘Alabuga’ special economic zone in Tatarstan. These are now routinely used to strike Ukrainian infrastructure. This cooperation with Iran became a vital resource for Moscow at the start of the full-scale war since it did not have the technical capacity to produce low-cost, long-range attack drones .

However, the military escalation between Iran and Israel may test the resilience of this cooperation. Increased pressure on Iran could disrupt the supply of components and technical support essential for uninterrupted production. This, in turn, renders the entire model of collaboration vulnerable – both with regard to defence supplies and technological self-sufficiency. The Russian side may be forced to adjust its supply chains and reallocate production resources in order to maintain drone output.

Economic interests. By the end of 2024, Russia had become the largest foreign investor in Iran. Key areas of investment include energy and transport infrastructure: gas development projects (with estimated investments of  up to $8 billion), the Bushehr nuclear power plant, the Sirik power station, and the international North–South transport corridor via rail infrastructure development. Conflict poses a serious threat to these projects, which may face delays as a result of  supply chain breakdowns, or outright cancellation.

Political interests. Strategically, Russia seeks to prevent both a major escalation and a renewed nuclear deal between Tehran and Washington. The latter would likely ease sanctions and lead Iran to refocus its foreign economic policy – reducing its dependence on Moscow. While Iran has demonstrated tactical loyalty under current conditions, this alignment is fragile and contingent on continued Western pressure.

Against this backdrop, the greatest threat to Russia is not the conflict itself, but potential regime change in Tehran. The establishment of a secular government – especially if the US intervenes directly – would likely terminate military–technical cooperation and disrupt logistics and transit agreements, threatening Russian assets and investment returns. It could also trigger the lifting of sanctions on Iran and a sharp increase in Iranian oil output – up to 500,000 barrels per day within six months – impacting Russia’s energy revenues. In addition, large-scale instability in Iran could spill over to Russia’s southern borders, forcing a redistribution of resources and greater security oversight.

Limited options for Russia

Under current conditions, with few real tools at its disposal, the Kremlin has three choices.:

1. Attempt mediation. Moscow responded to the outbreak of conflict by positioning itself as a mediator. Vladimir Putin condemned Israel’s actions, expressed condolences to Iran, and held talks with the leaders of the conflicting parties – Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and US President Donald Trump – signalling an intent to reassert Russia’s presence in the region.

By assuming the mantle of mediator, Putin seeks to expand the country’s influence on regional conflicts, despite evident political and resource constraints. This form of diplomatic bargaining is necessary to recover some of the geopolitical capital lost after the fall of the Assad regime. Reintegration into the diplomatic process would enable Moscow to claim the role of an effective actor in the Middle East while projecting to Global South countries the image of a responsible and indispensable mediator capable of counterbalancing Washington.

In addition, participation in negotiations would allow Russia to embed the Middle Eastern agenda within a broader framework of talks with the United States, including discussions on sanctions pressure. However, Russia’s actual capacity to serve as an active mediator in the conflict is limited: Moscow lacks real leverage over either Tehran or Tel Aviv.

The US response has already revealed the limits of Russia’s positioning. While Trump initially expressed ‘openness’ to Putin’s proposal to act as a mediator, he soon reversed his stance, emphasising that Russia should first focus on ending the conflict in Ukraine before claiming a moderating role in other international crises. A similar note of caution is evident in Israel’s stance: at this stage, its government does not view Moscow as a constructive intermediary. Iran also declined to endorse Russia’s role, instead turning to Qatar and Oman to facilitate mediation.

2. Provide grey-zone assistance. If acting as a mediator proves infeasible, Russia could theoretically provide Iran with limited support within the ‘grey zone’ – outside formal agreements and official channels of military–technical cooperation. This would not involve direct intervention, but rather indirect assistance such as the provision of air defence systems, satellite intelligence, or the conduct of cyber operations.

Russia might also assist with the removal of spent nuclear fuel  in line with its role in support of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal that aimed to ensure that Tehran would develop its nuclear programme for peaceful purposes only .

Nevertheless, the overall potential for such cooperation remains constrained both politically and logistically. Even deliveries routed through third countries – such as Belarus or select Central Asian states – appear unlikely and would carry significant risks. In practice, Moscow is likely to avoid actions that could provoke open conflict with Israel or increase pressure from the West.

3. Be a passive observer. Maintaining a formal presence without direct involvement enables Russia to retain the status of a concerned yet detached observer. This approach minimises reputational risks and allows for flexibility in the event of a shift in the regional balance of power. The internal instability of Iran’s political regime adds to this uncertainty: any transformation or destabilisation – as in the Syrian case, when Moscow chose to abandon Assad rather than intervene – could weaken Russia’s position in the region.