The new normal: Will the Kremlin use nuclear weapons?
Since 2022, the nuclear factor has become a central element of Russia’s foreign policy. The Kremlin has used nuclear rhetoric as a tool of pressure while modernising the nuclear triad and the system of strategic command, including potential shelters for the country’s top leadership. The updated doctrine has rendered the thresholds for the use of nuclear weapons ambiguous, and a quarter of Russian public opinion has begun to view their use as acceptable. A new nuclear paradigm is thus taking shape, in which weapons of mass destruction are transformed from a means of deterrence into an instrument of war.
The Kremlin’s nuclear rhetoric
On 5 November, during a meeting with the permanent members of Russia’s Security Council, Vladimir Putin instructed officials to prepare proposals for the possible resumption of full-scale nuclear tests in Russia. This move was a response to Donald Trump’s apparent order to prepare similar tests in the United States, signalling Moscow’s readiness for further nuclear escalation.
A few days before the Security Council meeting, Putin announced the ‘successful tests’ of the Burevestnik and Poseidon nuclear systems. He had first unveiled both projects in his 2018 address to the Federal Assembly, during which he also announced the development of the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, the Sarmat intercontinental missile, and the Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile. Of these, only the Kinzhal has entered serial production and is being actively used in the war in Ukraine. In practice, very little is known about the technical specifications of either the Burevestnik or the Poseidon.
Such statements, which the Kremlin routinely employs to exert pressure on adversaries, should primarily be viewed as part of an information campaign intended to highlight Russia’s military strength. Nuclear weapons have become not only an instrument of deterrence but also part of the psychological infrastructure of Moscow’s war against the collective West – a mechanism designed to sustain a sense of anxiety and uncertainty in Western societies.
According to surveys conducted in 2022, more than half of Finland’s population and 69 per cent of Germans expressed concern about the possibility of nuclear war. Following the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Finland, Switzerland, and Sweden began the large-scale modernisation of their networks of bomb shelters and fortifications, while the Baltic states launched the reconstruction of Cold War–era bunkers.
Moscow is well aware that this approach has proved highly effective with the Biden administration. It generated serious concern in Washington about the risks associated with providing Kyiv with military support that could have led to the defeat of Russia’s army in Ukraine and served as a potential justification for the use of nuclear weapons.
Modernisation of the nuclear triad
Behind the demonstrative rhetoric lies a more substantive reality – the near completion of Russia’s modernisation of its nuclear triad, encompassing land-based, naval, and airborne components.
In the Northern and Pacific Fleets, work is under way to improve ammunition storage and supporting infrastructure. New submarines – the Khabarovsk and the Belgorod – are being commissioned, while the Ulyanovsk is under construction. All are intended to serve as carriers for the Poseidon system.
Since the late 2010s, the Navy has been reinforced by Borei-A submarines – upgraded versions of the Borei-class strategic missile carriers, which serve as the primary platforms for RSM-56 Bulava ballistic missiles. In parallel, Yasen-M-class nuclear submarines such as the Perm, distinguished by their ability to launch high-precision Tsirkon hypersonic missiles, are being built.
As of early 2025, Russia possessed roughly 4,309 nuclear warheads stored at specialised military bases across the country, including in the Orenburg, Saratov, and Murmansk regions, among others. In recent years, many of these Soviet-era bases have been almost entirely rebuilt: hundreds of new barracks, watchtowers, command centres, and storage facilities have been constructed on their grounds, interconnected by underground tunnels.
The modernisation of the nuclear arsenal has been accompanied by the strengthening of strategic command and protection infrastructure, including the establishment of potential shelter zones for the country’s top leadership. One such location is believed to be the Altai Republic, a sparsely populated and hard-to-reach region on the border with China. Its remoteness, rugged terrain, and limited transport access make it a suitable option for a potential ‘hideout’ in the event of a nuclear conflict.
In 2011, the Altai Compound (Altaiskoye Podvorye) – a resort complex owned by Gazprom – was built in the Altai region and is often referred to as Vladimir Putin’s ‘residence’ or ‘dacha’. Several indirect indicators suggest that the complex may include an underground bunker constructed specifically for the president and his closest circle.
Additional infrastructure was developed to support the Altai Compound: a new road branching from the Chuysky Trakt highway, a dedicated power substation, helicopter pads, and other facilities. In 2024, Andrei Turchak – one of the key political managers within Putin’s system, formerly the First Deputy Speaker of the Federation Council and Secretary of the General Council of United Russia party – was appointed governor of Altai Krai. While some observers viewed his appointment to a weak region as a ‘demotion’, it may also signal the Kremlin’s intention to establish tighter political control over a territory of strategic importance.
A shift in paradigm
For Russia’s leadership, nuclear war is no longer seen as an unthinkable scenario. Nuclear weapons are now regarded not only as a tool of deterrence but also as a potential instrument of offensive action.
In 2024, Russia demonstratively revised its nuclear doctrine, expanding the list of conditions for the use of nuclear weapons and thereby blurring its principles to the point of profound ambiguity. Under the new framework, nuclear weapons may be used not only in response to an enemy’s nuclear strike but also if an act of aggression using conventional weapons creates a ‘critical threat to the sovereignty or territorial integrity of the state’.
Russian officials have repeatedly raised the possibility of a nuclear strike in the context of the war in Ukraine. In September 2022, Vladimir Putin warned of his readiness to use ‘all available means’ to defend Russia’s territorial integrity, stressing that ‘this is not a bluff’. Former president Dmitry Medvedev and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov later emphasised the ‘reality’ of the nuclear threat and Russia’s right to use such weapons in the event of a threat to its existence. Between 2023 and 2025, this rhetoric became a routine element of official discourse, with the Russian leadership regularly emphasising the role of its nuclear arsenal as both a guarantee of sovereignty and a deterrent against the West.
Even within the Kremlin’s expert circles, more radical ideas were voiced. Notably, the political scientist Sergei Karaganov, working on assignment for the presidential administration, proposed a pre-emptive nuclear strike on Europe as a means of forcing the West to concede and bringing the war in Ukraine to an end.
At the same time, the logic guiding Russia’s security elites – and Vladimir Putin personally – blends strategic calculation with elements of ideological and mythological thinking, making even seemingly irrational scenarios potentially plausible. Against the backdrop of weakened diplomatic channels and the distorted interpretation of signals, the risk of misreading intentions and triggering unintended escalation has also increased.
Public opinion in Russia regarding whether the use of nuclear weapons is justified has remained fluid and highly responsive to official rhetoric since the start of the war in Ukraine. By November 2024, the share of those who considered a nuclear strike justified had reached 39 per cent – a peak coinciding with the intensification of fighting and the Kremlin’s increasingly aggressive rhetoric. By mid-2025, the ratio of opinions among those with a definite position had shifted from 2:1 to 4:1 against a nuclear strike, likely reflecting a temporary softening of official discourse amid a burst of diplomatic signalling.
At the same time, the share of those supporting the use of nuclear weapons – around one quarter of respondents – remains high, indicating the gradual normalisation of the very idea of a nuclear strike as an acceptable course of action. A renewed wave of nuclear escalation could once again strengthen support for a forceful approach and promote the militarisation of public sentiment.
Under these conditions, China remains one of the few external factors capable of constraining nuclear escalation by Moscow. According to reports, Xi Jinping repeatedly advised Vladimir Putin to moderate his nuclear rhetoric, considering it destabilising and contrary to China’s interests.
As a result, a tactical nuclear strike by Russia remains an unlikely but possible step should the Kremlin come to believe that the situation in Ukraine threatens the regime’s survival.