The unknown toll: estimating Russian military losses in Ukraine

From the start of Russia’s full-scale war on Ukraine in February 2022, Russian military fatalities have far exceeded those recorded in earlier conflicts, including the wars in Chechnya and Afghanistan.

Analysts from the ‘Re:Russia’ project estimated that by January 2023 the number of Russian dead was between 30,000 and 90,000. Today, even the most conservative figures exceed 100,000. The wide disparity in numbers highlights not only the scale of the tragedy but also the state's lack of transparency. Until 2022, official statistics included a general category for those ‘wounded as a result of military action’. Since then information on fatalities within this group has no longer been disclosed, and is now classified. At present, no full or reliable account of the actual death toll is available.

An increase in excess mortality was identified in Russia in 2022 and 2023 (see Fig. 1) with a total of 138,500 excess deaths among men aged 20 to 54 – a demographic group most commonly targeted for military mobilisation. While not a direct measure of battlefield losses, this figure serves as an indirect indicator of the scale of military activity and its broader impact on mortality.

Two statistical approaches

Estimates of Russian military deaths began to circulate in the early days of the war. Currently, around a dozen assessments exist, produced by international organisations, officials, experts, and media outlets. These can generally be divided into two groups: the unreliable ones, which use unverifiable methods; and the more reliable ones, which still provide incomplete data.

The first category includes figures released by the two warring parties, foreign officials, and various Telegram channels. These sources are often biased or rely on opaque methodologies, which explains the wide discrepancies in their reported numbers.

For example, in 2023, Ukraine’s Ground Forces Commander, Alexandr Pavlyuk, estimated that 25,000 to 30,000 Russian soldiers were dying each month – a figure echoed by retired US Army Lieutenant General Herbert McMaster. By contrast, Vladimir Putin claimed monthly losses of 5,000. In February 2024 Volodymyr Zelensky stated that 180,000 Russian soldiers had been killed, while then French Foreign Minister Stéphane Séjourné cited a figure of 150,000.

The second, more credible category encompasses most estimates produced by experts and media outlets. Although their methodologies are not always transparent or consistent, several assessments are widely considered trustworthy.

The most reliable estimates to date come from Mediazona and the BBC. As of 25 April 2025, they had identified 107,600 confirmed deaths. Their assessment is based on a transparent methodology and draws on open-source information, including only those whose deaths have been independently verified. The official date of death does not always align with the period when individuals are added to the database. The Mediazona authors themselves describe the figure above as a minimum estimate. Demographer Alexei Raksha suggests multiplying the reported number of military fatalities by two or two and a half to approximate the true scale of losses.

Mediazona and the BBC also provide a separate estimate in collaboration with Dmitry Kobak, a researcher in excess mortality at the Department of Data Science, University of Tübingen. This is based on an analysis of probate cases for Russian men and statistics published by Rosstat for the period of the war. Before a probate case can be opened, a death has to be confirmed.

Based on these figures, the number of excess probate cases is compared with both the estimated excess deaths and the verified list of fatalities. This analysis suggests that the current death toll is approximately 165,000. However, the methodology has acknowledged limitations. Not all soldiers leave behind a will – some have no assets to bequeath – so many deaths may not appear in probate records. These estimates also do not include prisoners of war or individuals from the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics who participated in the fighting.

Research methodology

This analysis does not aim to determine the precise number of Russian military fatalities in the war against Ukraine. Instead, it focuses on assessing excess mortality rates and identifying the age groups where observed deaths most significantly deviate from expected levels. The number of excess deaths illustrates the consequences of the war both directly (losses in battle) and indirectly (worsening socio-economic conditions).

The study draws on official statistics broken down into five-year age groups. Age-specific and age-standardised mortality rates (based on the 2013 European age standard) were used in the calculations. The latter allows for adjustment of population age structure, enabling more accurate comparisons of mortality across Russian regions.

Based on this data, excess mortality among men aged 20 to 54 was assessed for the years 2022 and 2023. This indicator reflects the extent to which actual mortality exceeded expected mortality in these years. The expected figures were calculated using a linear extrapolation of mortality rates from the 2015–2019 period – a method appropriate for short-term forecasting.

Key findings

The age structure of excess mortality in Russia remained consistent across 2022 and 2023 (see Fig. 2). The largest increase in mortality was observed among men aged 20 to 39. In 2022, the highest figure was for men aged 20 to 24. The mortality rate among this group was 137 per cent of the expected figure (up by 4,398 deaths). In 2023, the highest increase was for the group aged 25 to 29: 212 per cent up on the expected figure (up by 7,979 deaths). Overall, the mortality rate among working-age men was 25 per cent higher than expected in 2022 and 33 per cent higher in 2023.

In absolute terms, the highest estimated mortality figures were among men over the age of 30, reflecting the larger size of this demographic compared to younger cohorts. In both 2022 and 2023 the highest numbers of excess deaths were seen in the 45 to 49 age group: 11,181 in the first year, and 15,998 in the second. Over this two-year period, excess mortality among men aged 20 to 54 is estimated to have increased by 138,500: 57,800 in 2022 and 80,800 the following year. This figure is substantially higher than the estimated 24,000 excess deaths among women in the same age groups over the same period.

Not all of these cases are directly linked to the war. Some may be caused by worsening socio-economic conditions, greater stress, a shortage of medical help or other factors. However, these figures also understate the full scale of losses: they exclude those missing in action, whose deaths remain unconfirmed, as well as fighters from the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, which are not accounted for in official Russian statistics.

In terms of regional variation, the highest excess mortality figures are found in Russia’s poorest areas and in Ukrainian territories occupied prior to 2022, such as Sevastopol (see Fig. 3).

The five regions with the highest number of excess deaths in 2022 were: Sevastopol (65 per cent); Jewish Autonomous Region (56 per cent); Chechnya (55 per cent); Dagestan (47 per cent); and Astrakhan Region (44 per cent). In 2023 (see Fig. 4.), the highest numbers were in: Sevastopol (80 per cent); Jewish Autonomous Region (67 per cent); Astrakhan Region (57 per cent); Tuva (55 per cent); and Dagestan (55 per cent).

Some regional differences are minimal, and the ranking may vary depending on minor fluctuations. The lowest incidences of excess mortality in 2022 were recorded in Chukotka, North Ossetia, Kemerovo Region and the Altai Republic.

Conclusion

The results make it possible to draw a cautious conclusion about those segments of the population that have been most affected by the war. In relative terms, the highest increase in mortality was observed among men aged 20 to 24. In absolute terms, however, the greatest losses occurred among men over 30. Regionally, the impact has been most severe in Russia’s poorest regions where many residents enlist with the Ministry of Defence to meet basic economic needs.

Excess mortality among men under the age of 20 has not been included in these estimates, although this group has also suffered losses. Including males aged 15 to 20 raises the total number of excess deaths only slightly – from 138,500 to 140,400.

The estimates in this analysis closely match figures published by Mediazona and the BBC. Nevertheless, all available datasets omit several categories likely to be recognised in future as war-related losses. These include soldiers who have not returned from Ukraine for various reasons, including those killed and buried on the battlefield, as well as those listed as missing in action. Under existing procedures, individuals in the latter category may only be officially counted among the dead five years after their disappearance.

In addition, the estimates referenced here cover only the years 2022 and 2023 and do not include data for 2024. According to Mediazona, the number of verified deaths in 2024 is already double that recorded during the first year of the war. Population data for 2024 – essential for disaggregating mortality by age and sex – is scheduled for release in summer 2025, although publication is not guaranteed.

Amid the repression of independent journalism and human rights monitoring, and with official sources increasingly distorting statistical information, access to credible data has become severely limited. The CEDAR project stresses that all currently available data is unreliable and may be significantly distorted – both due to limited access to battlefield information and deliberate efforts to obscure the scale of Russia’s losses.

Since the outbreak of the war, access to information that could allow even an approximate assessment of military casualties or the broader impact of the war on living conditions has become increasingly restricted. In 2024, Rosstat classified data on external causes of death, including fatalities directly linked to military operations. In 2025, the agency withheld publication of life expectancy figures by region. More recently, it has also suspended the release of regional data on births, deaths, marriages, and divorces. These measures have further hampered attempts to estimate even the approximate number of Russian military personnel killed in the war.