War in the Persian Gulf and the prospects of a Russian offensive in Ukraine
The war in the Gulf creates a limited window of opportunity for Moscow to intensify offensive operations in Ukraine. Higher oil prices support the budget, while the situation around Iran distracts the United States and increases competition for air defence systems and ammunition. At the same time, the crisis within the European Union is blocking a loan to Ukraine. However, this window is narrow and does not guarantee a military turning point. The spring mud period (rasputitsa) and the persistent structural constraints of the Russian army will not allow a rapid shift in the balance of forces on the battlefield. Most likely, the Kremlin will continue the tactic of gradually pushing the opponent back along selected sections of the front.
Window for an offensive
Rising oil and gas prices are turning the war in the Middle East into an important resource for Moscow. Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz has deprived the global market of a significant share of oil supply, and demand for Russian crude oil has increased sharply.
An increase in the export oil price of 10 dollars per barrel adds 1.1–1.2 billion dollars to the Russian budget per month. Given that in January and February of this year the average price of Russian export oil was around 42 dollars per barrel, additional revenues in April are expected to amount to at least 4.5 billion dollars.
At the same time, higher energy prices make it more difficult for Western countries to sustain a strict sanctions regime and an aggressive policy of reducing reliance on Russian resources without triggering rising domestic discontent. Expanded export opportunities give the Kremlin greater confidence that it can continue the war in 2026 without resorting to cuts in non-military budget expenditure, which the Ministry of Finance had begun to plan.
The Middle Eastern conflict also diverts Western attention from Ukraine. The escalation around Iran has already halted the negotiation process, reduced the intensity of discussions on new aid packages for Ukraine, slowed decision-making, and strengthened the position of Hungary within the EU as the advocate of a ‘pause’ in assistance to Kyiv.
In addition, war in the Middle East increases competition for the same production capacities, turning Ukraine into one of several recipients of limited supplies of air defence systems and ammunition. This does not mean an immediate cessation of aid to Kyiv, but it increases the risk of delays. This affects Ukraine’s ability to offset the Russian army's quantitative advantage on the battlefield and protect its industrial and energy infrastructure.
Success is not guaranteed
However, this window for increased pressure on Ukraine does not guarantee Moscow a turning point in the war. Given internal constraints, the Kremlin is unlikely to attempt a rapid breakthrough of the front, preferring instead to continue a slow war of attrition.
Russia continues to face constraints related to the quality and structure of its military grouping deployed in Ukraine. A significant portion of the experienced officer and non-commissioned officer corps has been lost, which reduces the army’s ability to plan and conduct complex offensive operations.
Although the Kremlin retains the option of carrying out large-scale mobilisation within a relatively short period, there are no signs that such a step is imminent. The Kremlin prefers to encourage the regions to use new recruitment practices as part of a ‘creeping’ mobilisation. These include pressure on students with academic arrears, tightening the rules governing alternative civilian service, and active recruitment of conscripts, reservists, and foreign nationals. This leads to an inflow of less-trained and weakly motivated personnel into the army.
In any case, large-scale mobilisation would likely reduce combat effectiveness, as there are insufficient training centres and weapons to train hundreds of thousands of new recruits. In addition, the effective use of drones by Ukrainian forces significantly complicates the formation of large military groupings necessary for major breakthroughs within a distance of up to 50 kilometres from the line of contact. This precludes the possibility of a surprise strike, making large-scale operations much less effective and rendering scenarios of a rapid collapse of Ukrainian defences unlikely.
From the Kremlin’s perspective, this configuration does not appear to be a failure. On the one hand, there are few prospects for a rapid military turning point, and there are reasonable doubts about Donald Trump’s ability to compel Volodymyr Zelenskyy to conclude peace on Russian terms. Yet the Russian army is slowly pushing Ukrainian forces out of Donbas, advancing towards Zaporizhzhia, and taking, albeit small, areas in Sumy and Kharkiv regions. These territories may be used as bargaining chips when the parties move towards fixing a line of division.
For as long as Vladimir Putin can demonstrate to his inner circle and to President Donald Trump that his current war-fighting approach allows him to convert minimal tactical gains into a gradual shift of the front line in his favour, he has no incentive to resort to risky decisions or to make serious concessions in negotiations, if and when they resume.