Worse than drones: Russians react acutely to blocking and shutdowns, and resentment is growing

Shutdowns of mobile internet and the blocking of popular messaging services are experienced acutely by both opponents of Vladimir Putin and his supporters. Experts at the NEST Centre and ExtremeScan have concluded that restrictions on communication attract more attention than drone attacks and sanctions. Against the backdrop of large-scale shutdowns and new restrictions, the approval ratings of Putin and United Russia are declining.

What has happened?

By the frequency of internet shutdowns, Russia already ranked first in the world last year, experiencing around 37,000 hours of outages, which began in May 2025, following Ukrainian drone attacks on strategic bomber bases. Since then, even in regions far from the front line, dozens and even hundreds of mobile internet outages have been recorded each month. In the first three months of 2026 alone, users reported around 6,000 incidents.

In almost all regions, allowlists have been introduced, consisting of several dozen government-approved websites that remain accessible even during shutdowns.¹

At the same time, Roskomnadzor is blocking the most popular messaging services – Telegram and WhatsApp. In their place, a domestic analogue, MAX, is being actively promoted by VK, a company headed by the son of Sergei Kiriyenko, First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration. According to official statements, by the beginning of this year, more than 85 million Russians were already communicating via the new messenger. At the same time, many switch to MAX under compulsion, due to pressure at work or in educational institutions.

How do Russians perceive pressure on the internet?

Shutdowns and the blocking of messaging services are the most painful restrictions currently in place in Russia, according to 47 per cent of respondents in a survey conducted by the independent sociological project ExtremeScan in February–March 2026 (a nationwide sample of around 1,600 people).² According to the same study, sanctions or the withdrawal of Western brands following the invasion of Ukraine are perceived as significantly less serious problems. They cause inconvenience to around 16 per cent and 20 per cent of respondents, respectively.

As early as October 2025, at least 55 per cent of respondents in a survey by the independent sociological project PROPA (a nationwide sample of around 2,700 people) said they feared mobile internet shutdowns. A similar share of respondents, 52 per cent, said they would not want to experience the consequences of drone attacks.

Earlier, in summer 2025, when Telegram and WhatsApp had just been partially blocked, more than 70 per cent of Russians opposed their full prohibition and replacement with MAX. At the same time, around 50 per cent reported that their lives had become more difficult because calls via Telegram and WhatsApp were no longer possible. By March this year, this share had risen to nearly 70 per cent; a similar proportion reported inconvenience due to shutdowns.

In February–March 2026, around 80 per cent of respondents in the ExtremeScan survey had experienced mobile internet shutdowns, and a further 70 per cent had noticed that messaging services were blocked. Notably, at least 60 per cent of respondents in the Siberian and Far Eastern federal districts had personally experienced shutdowns. This indicates that mobile internet outages do not occur only in areas where there is a threat of drone attacks.

Which of the following has occurred in your city or district over the past year?

February–March 2026

The use of VPNs has increased across the country: from September 2025 to March 2026, according to ExtremeScan data, the share of internet users who make use of them rose from 27 per cent to 36 per cent.

How do supporters of the authorities and the war view shutdowns?

Among those who approve of Putin’s actions and the ‘special military operation’, fewer people report noticing restrictions on mobile internet or fearing their introduction. However, communication restrictions still affect a substantial share of government supporters.

The differences between the responses of opposition-minded and pro-government Russians could be explained by the higher average age of the latter, who primarily receive news on television. However, the gap persists even when comparing opponents and supporters of the Kremlin who obtain news online (and a majority of the latter do so).

These differences stem from two factors. First, supporters of the authorities are more likely to work in public sector institutions and state-owned companies. Their livelihoods depend less on mobile internet, which private businesses and sole traders rely on to receive and fulfil orders – for example, taxi drivers or catering services.

Second, political attitudes and media consumption patterns play a role. Those who support Putin are more likely to accept official explanations for the restrictions and to view shutdowns and blocking as necessary measures to ensure national security and protect against fraud. In addition, these Russians watch the news on television more often. They are also less likely to experience the negative effects of allowlists, unlike those accustomed to consuming news from independent sources.

How do digital repression and shutdowns affect the authorities’ approval ratings?

Internet shutdowns and blocking clearly do not improve perceptions of the authorities and may have a significant negative effect on public opinion overall.

On their own, shutdowns and the tightening of internet censorship have not, so far, led to an immediate drop in the authorities’ approval ratings. Neither in May 2025, when mobile internet outages became routine, nor in the summer and autumn of the same year, against the backdrop of the partial blocking of Telegram and WhatsApp, was there a sharp decline in approval for Putin, United Russia, or regional authorities (data from the Levada Centre and VCIOM).

However, accumulated dissatisfaction is reflected in a broader deterioration of public sentiment. Since mid-2025, the share of those who believe that the country is moving in the right direction has been gradually declining. By the end of last year, this indicator had fallen by around 6 per cent. The percentage who approve of the authorities’ domestic, foreign, social, and economic policies has also decreased.

In the first quarter of 2026, a sustained decline began in approval of Putin’s performance as President and in willingness to vote for United Russia, by around 4–5 per cent in both cases (data from the Levada Centre and VCIOM).

This decline is most likely due to a combination of factors: rising prices and taxes, deteriorating material conditions, accumulated fatigue from the war, and disappointment with the course of peace negotiations. Against this background, the sharp tightening of internet restrictions at the beginning of the year, particularly in March, served as an additional irritant, intensifying existing dissatisfaction and potentially turning it into a more sustained decline in trust in the authorities.