Putin’s army adapts tactically, but systemic flaws, heavy losses, poor morale, and reliance on foreign aid expose its failure to achieve strategic gains.
Improvements Since 2022
After a very poorly conducted invasion of Ukraine and a very difficult first year in combat, the Russian army re-grouped and re-discovered military doctrine and tactics. This allowed it to repel the Ukrainian counter-offensive in 2023 and regain the tactical initiative in 2024 despite very high human and equipment costs. It has so far not been able to turn local tactical success on the front line into deep operations to unlock Ukraine’s defences.
It has improved its force structures, logistics, operations and supply of equipment, successfully integrating old Soviet era equipment with newer technologies.
There has also been a marked improvement in tactical precision strikes by reducing the time between finding a target and attacking it. Rapid adoption of unmanned air systems through utilisation of Iranian and private and state suppliers has led to the integration of large numbers of drones and helped make Russian kill chains more efficient. Drone lethality and success rates have also increased as Russian operators have become more efficient.
Electronic warfare has also improved, countering the advantage that Ukrainian drone operators experienced at the start of the conflict, and complicating use of western-supplied weapons dependent on GPS.
The targeting process for attacking Ukrainian critical infrastructure has improved with much greater focus on higher impact targets than at the start of the war. The result has been the destruction of 50% of Ukraine’s peak power generation capacity.
The Russian military industrial complex has increased production, proven resilient to sanctions, and is now gearing up for longer-term confrontation. Nevertheless, it continues to have capacity issues. These include problems with access to tools and components, and labour shortages which limit output and lead to a focus on quantity rather than quality. Production of newer generation equipment has been side-lined at the expense of building or repairing older, trusted equipment.
What Has Not Changed?
Since the ground forces have done most of the fighting, much of the capability of the rest of the Russian armed forces remains largely untouched by the war. Apart from the Black Sea Fleet (BSF), the Navy remains untouched in its prime operating areas: the Barents, Arctic, and Pacific. The nuclear deterrent triad is also untouched, with further test firings taking place.
Although the Aerospace Forces have not achieved air superiority over Ukraine, this is not a task for which they were designed. They still have the capacity to present a significant challenge for any conventional aggressor, although they have struggled to deal with the Ukrainian drone and missile threat in Crimea. Key airborne early warning and command and control aircraft shot down by the Ukrainians/Wagner have not been replaced.
The army remains heavily centralized with planning conducted in Moscow and delegated for execution to the fronts. Trust between various echelons and services is weak, leading to a lack of unity of effort and competition for resources. Corruption remains endemic as does a disregard by officers for the lives and well-being of their subordinates. Tactical doctrine is inconsistently applied, increasing loss of life.
The armed forces have consistently shown a lack of understanding of their adversary, overconfidence in the attack, and a tendency to under-estimate Ukrainians. As shown in 2022 and again in 2024, strategic military intelligence on Ukraine is weak, leading to surprise at Kharkiv, Kherson and Kursk. There is also a lack of challenge, a tendency to ‘group think’, and to tell the hierarchy what it wants to hear. Those willing to speak out have been fired.
In What Areas Has the Army Weakened?
The Russian professional army of early 2022 turned to dust in Ukraine with heavy casualties among junior officers and NCOs. As the army shifted to improvising and then using a follow-on-force of older, inexperienced and badly trained volunteers for attritional frontal assaults, its overall quality has reduced.
Training for large-scale combined arms operations has also ceased or been curtailed. The army also faces problems with worn out artillery barrels (requiring 1–2 years to replace in full) and an overall lack of manufacturing capacity to replace equipment lost in Ukraine.
Stockpiles of long-range conventional missiles have reduced, decreasing their deterrent effect against NATO, and increasing the importance of the nuclear triad. ‘Hypersonic’ ballistic missiles have not proven to be the unstoppable game changer as predicted by Putin.
Russian naval power in the Black Sea is noticeably reduced. The BSF lost sea control over much of the area and been forced to retreat from Sevastopol after destruction of its key repair facilities.
What Is Needed And How Long Will It Take To Restore Weakened Aspects?
Putin has ordered the expansion of the Russian armed forces to 1.5 million active servicemen. It will take 4–5 years to reach this target, but it is highly unlikely that the army will be able to conduct large-scale, combined arms operations without a long period (7–10 years) of re-building. This will take many years of reconstitution of men, equipment, force structure changes as well as realistic training. This will need to be balanced with available government funding and demography. It may prove hard to retain experienced army personnel once the war in Ukraine is over. Re-building the officer corps and improving its skills, particularly at junior officer level will place significant strain on the military education system. This will take 2–3 years.
What to Expect if the War Continues
Russia faces multiple financial and demographic challenges that constrain how and how far it can regrow its armed forces qualitatively and quantitatively by 2030, while still sustaining its war in Ukraine.
In the short term, the army is managing to refurbish older equipment at sufficient rates, mobilizing adequate personnel, and recruiting enough volunteers to continue to fight in Ukraine. The economy, although under obvious strain, is finding enough resource to fund the war. The army can continue fighting for another 1–1.5 years at current rates of attrition.
Russia continues to manufacture and then fire air, land and sea launched cruise missiles against Ukraine. It is unlikely that strategic reserves of these missiles can be increased dramatically as the war continues. This is compromising strategic conventional deterrence. Focus on sustaining the war is unlikely to allow for adequate attention to the task of rebuilding the army. This process is also compromised by the Kremlin’s desire to avoid full war mobilisation of the economy or people.
In Case of a Truce?
A truce (horizon — 2–3 years) would allow Russia to start to rebuild its army into the 2030s while relying on older Soviet equipment in the meantime for defence. But the process would be slow in particular because of the capacity of military industry as well as corruption.
Ratio to NATO/Chinese Army
Despite Putin’s goal to make the army the second largest in the world after China, the correlation of forces is still challenging for the Kremlin. Assuming over the next 1–2 years a Russian army of around 1.1 million and NATO forces of 3.5 million, NATO will have a 3:1 advantage. This assumes an enduring commitment to NATO of the U.S. military. The Russian army is also qualitatively at a disadvantage to NATO although it has the important advantage of recent combat experience and exposure to some of the rapid technological changes that are revolutionizing the battlefield. Assuming a Chinese army of around 4 million, Russia will be at a 1:4 disadvantage. In addition, the Chinese military is modernizing very quickly.
The Role of Foreign Suppliers
Supplies from China, Iran, and North Korea have helped Russia to mitigate the impact of sanctions and domestic war pressures. The three have supplied Russia with much needed dual-use items, arms, and spare parts. While these goods have generally been of lower quality than their Western alternatives, they have allowed Russia to maintain its war in Ukraine and contributed to Russia’s battlefield progress in 2024.
Without this support, Russia would be unable to maintain its tempo or replenish losses as quickly.
Russia has reportedly received semiconductors, ball bearings, and machine tools through a complicated network of Chinese shell companies. Military industry has used these Chinese shipments speed up the refurbishment and modernization of its abundant supplies of Soviet-era equipment drawn from storage, including tanks, artillery and missiles. Chinese companies have also supplied domestically manufactured commercial drones. China has so far avoided direct supply of arms to Russia.
Prospects for Interaction/Confrontation in Different Theatres
There has been extensive military co-operation between Russia and China in recent years, including joint exercises, air patrols and naval deployments. In military terms, the damage to the army from the war in Ukraine has underlined Russia’s position as the junior partner of China.
Putin and Xi have spoken about improving defence co-operation, but a rumoured mutual defence pact has not materialized. Conversely, North Korea has signed a mutual defence pact. In return for troops, arms and ammunition, Pyongyang will receive money, aid, arms, and military know-how. There is a real risk of an escalation on the Korean peninsula and of missile/nuclear proliferation as Russia tries to pressure Washington into curtailing support to Ukraine by creating anxiety in South Korea about the transfer of missile technology.
Russia and Iran have a burgeoning defence relationship although Iran has not yet signed a mutual defence pact (although it is rumoured to be in preparation). Iran is very keen to receive Russian aircraft, arms and air defence systems. So far Russia has declined to provide these goods for fear of upsetting its UAE and Saudi partners. Although the geo-political interests and anti-Americanism unite Russia with its Chinese, Iranian and North Korean partners, talk of a formal CRINK military alliance is overblown.
