U.S.–Russia relations have undergone significant shifts over the past decade, with strategic missteps shaping the current geopolitical landscape. The Biden administration’s approach to the Russian–Ukrainian conflict and its broader strategy toward Russia reveal a prioritization of short-term tactical gains at the expense of long-term objectives. The considerations below examine the pitfalls of such an approach, outline the challenges inherent in reshaping relations with Russia, and offer insights into how the U.S. might prepare for a post-Putin future. Understanding and addressing these dynamics is crucial, not only for the U.S.–Russia relationship but also for the broader competition with China and the stability of the international order.

1. The Biden administration made a significant error in its relations with Russia in general and over the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in particular: solving tactical issues was prioritised over solving strategic issues. 
2. Although it was important to limit Russia’s expansion into the post-Soviet space and partly into Europe, this was simply a tactical task. Keeping Russia within the area of the West’s influence was and remains a strategic task in the context of the growing competition between the U.S. and China. To some extent, the U.S. muddled its strategic priorities with those of Europe and even those of Eastern Europe. 
3. The U.S. made the same mistake with Russia as Russia itself made with Ukraine: in 2014, the Kremlin gained Crimea and south-eastern Ukraine but lost the whole of Ukraine. And in 2022, the U.S. gained Ukraine and a significant part of the post-Soviet space but lost Russia, effectively
   singlehandedly pushing it into China’s embrace.
4. Just ending the war in Ukraine is not in the interests of the U.S.. Instead, it should be interested in ending it in such a way that in the long term it can regain some competitive influence over Russia’s foreign and domestic policies; or at least ensure Russia takes a neutral position in the event of an escalation of the conflict with China.
5. In present circumstances, it is highly unlikely that it will be possible to re-establish normal relations with Russia while Putin remains in power. But this does not mean that the goal is unattainable in principle. If the U.S. wants to achieve a strategic change in its relations with Russia after Putin goes, then it is essential to lay the groundwork for this now, while he is still in power.
6. In this case, actions which may appear rational from a tactical point of view in the ongoing struggle with Putin’s regime may, in fact, turn out to be of little use when it comes to achieving strategic aims – that is, specific geopolitical results. The window of opportunity for this will open only after Putin departs the scene. The reverse may also be true.
7. One of the mistaken ideas of the Biden administration – and in this they have been influenced by the Russian opposition in exile – is the belief that Russia’s turn towards China under Putin has simply been because of the influence Putin and his circle have had on the country. Their logic is that it will be enough to remove Putin and his circle as the element influencing Russia’s political life and, as a result, this trend will be overcome, and Russia will automatically turn back again to the West. Unfortunately, this is far from being the case.
8. Putin has undoubtedly played a significant role in switching the basic paradigm of Russian foreign policy away from its previous focus on the West. But this did not come out of nowhere, nor is he the sole reason that this happened. Whatever comes next, it is likely that even after Putin goes Russian society will still look towards China more than in the past and will continue to regard the West with suspicion. It will take time and effort to reverse this situation.
9. On this basis, any populist party that comes to power in Russia – whatever slogans it comes out with – will once again inevitably be anti-American, and to some extent pro-China and neo-totalitarian. The mood of society will force it to be so. It is worth bearing in mind that Putin himself started out with the idea of Russia joining NATO and integrating with Europe.
10. Democratic elections of a single leader in post-Putin Russia will inevitably bring to power someone in Putin’s mould or even someone who is even more anti-American. An undemocratic seizure of power will lead to an even greater split among the elites and, in two moves, will make the leader of the victorious group just as dependent on the mood of the masses. The only factor that could change this pattern would be if the elites were to act collectively and responsibly.
11. In other words, to break the existing ‘social agreement’, there is a need for time as well as sensible, consolidated and well-organised efforts on the part of the elites. They will have to re-establish their political influence in society, and not allow some small political group to carry out a smash-and-grab raid. Policies will be needed that have a popular appeal together with a long-term focus and rely on significant social groups in Russian society, rather than narrow political circles. This is the kind of work that the West carried out successfully in the 1970s, and which led successfully to Gorbachev’s perestroika.
12. Two factors will be essential to achieve this: first, the focus should be on collective and cooperative action; and second, there must be a reduction in tension. On the one hand, it will be essential to promote the formation of a coalition that is as wide as possible and ensure that it receives support. This should include elite representation from a wide variety of levels, first and foremost from the regions. This coalition should be capable of exerting a long-term and organised influence on Russian society, aimed at reversing the geopolitical turn in favour of China which has happened under Putin. On the other hand, it will be essential to change the policy of isolating the Russian elites from the West to one of re-establishing and stimulating their interest in the West as the preferred social model.
13. Until now in the case of Russia, the West has bet strategically on a small group of apparently pro-Western politicians who, should they come to power, would ensure that the country turns once again towards the influence of the West. At the same time, the assumption has been that Russia would generally be ruled in a similar way to how it has been up until now, including under Putin, but this would be done by ‘the right people’ and ‘in the right direction’.
14. In reality, the whole political process in Russia needs to be changed, the very foundation on which both Russian domestic and foreign policy stands. It is impossible to do this by relying on a particular individual or party (or group). Institutional decisions are needed and they must be prepared while Putin is still in power.