Summary

Since the start of the war in Ukraine, the elite has lost both influence and independence. Through comprehensive reshuffles, Putin has increased the government’s dependence on himself: he now requires not just loyalty, but personal devotion. As a result, the top executive power increasingly displays the features of a royal court. None of the major figures in power and the clans behind them emerged stronger as a result of the reshuffle. Sergei Shoigu became relatively weaker, losing his post as Minister of Defense as well as his team. His replacement Andrei Belousov, former first deputy prime minister, has never had his own team and still does not. Nikolai Patrushev, who formally ceded the post of Secretary of the Security Council to Shoigu, largely retained his influence there, and at the same time received important resources, both administrative and material. The appointment of Boris Kovalchuk, the former head of a large corporation, first as a second-line manager in the Presidential Administration, and then as head of the Accounts Chamber, demonstrates the weakening positions of his father Yuri and the entire Kovalchuk clan.

A good half of the new appointees are either relatives of Putin’s associates or of Putin himself, or former aides to the president. The important thing is that they belong only to the Putin family in a broad sense and have no other corporate loyalties. Three of Putin’s former aides now play key roles: Dmitry Mironov as chief personnel officer, Alexei Dyumin as coordinator of military affairs and Secretary of the State Council, and Valery Pikalyov as head of customs (a crucial role in view of western sanctions). Long time Putin’s senior comrade in arms Nikolai Patrushev, now in the specially created role of presidential assistant, has gained even more responsibility than he had as Secretary of the Security Council, when he played a key part in advancing Putin’s geopolitical ambitions.

Key appointments include: Putin’s niece Anna Tsivileva as Deputy Defense Minister, his friend’s son Boris Kovalchuk as head of the Accounts Chamber, Dmitry Patrushev (Nikolai’s son) as Deputy Prime Minister, Pavel Fradkov (son of a former Prime Minister) as Deputy Defense Minister, and Putin’s university classmate Irina Podnosova as Chair of the Supreme Court.

Putin is no longer an autocratic president. He is now an ageing tsar, allowing only those who meet his personal criteria near the levers of power. His personal power looks even more secure today than before the reshuffle, but this stability, being personalist rather than institutional, is, as in the case of Stalin, fragile.

Introduction

After the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Russian elite lost its (relative) freedom to act independently or cohesively, something it had been able to maintain even after the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014. These people have now become merely cogs of a machine: a group of bureaucrats totally dependent on serving the man in charge. This signifies a sharp decrease in these officials’ area of responsibility and their role in forward planning, the loss of any ability to influence matters, and a lack of any desire even to understand how the system works. It is more accurate now to describe them not as the political elite, but as managers who are no more than a bureaucratic or even mafia-type elite.

A Reshuffle of Personnel in 2024

The reshuffle of May 2024 is highly significant, primarily in terms of the configuration of the senior level of Russia’s management elite, rather than its composition. The objective was to regroup forces at the top in response to a change in priorities, by rotating representatives of the major groups around the federal ministries and filling in the resulting vacancies.

The Federal Customs Service, for instance, is now headed by Putin’s former bodyguard, Valery Pikalyov, who replaced FSB general Vladimir Bulavin. The Accounts Chamber is now the domain of Boris Kovalchuk, a son of Putin’s friend and “wallet” Yury Kovalchuk. He replaced the supposedly “liberal” Alexei Kudrin (former Minister of Finance, 2000–2011). Both Bulavin and Kudrin left in 2023—more than a year before their successors were appointed. Bulavin became a senator while Kudrin left state service.

Irina Podnosova, a long-serving judge who studied alongside Putin, has been appointed Chair of the Supreme Court, filling the position left vacant by the death of Vyacheslav Lebedev, who had held the role for 32 years. New faces appeared in the Defense Ministry, too, following a clear-out after the appointment of Andrei Belousov as minister.

The clear motivation behind the reshuffle was to strengthen Putin’s personal control over the influential “state corporations” (the Ministry of Defense, the Federal Customs Service, and the Accounts Chamber as an instrument of power); over institutions such as the Supreme Court and the State Council; and over the spending of state funds.

Personnel in the Kremlin

The personnel bloc within the Kremlin apparatus has changed dramatically. In the 2010s, FSB generals played the most significant roles: Sergei Ivanov (2011–2016), Anatoly Seryshev (2018–2021), and Andrei Chobotov (2017–2023). Now, these key positions are occupied by the former presidential aide from the Federal Protection Service, Dmitry Mironov (since 2021), and two long-serving officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Anton Vaino (from 2016) and Maxim Travnikov (from 2023). All three are from the generation below their predecessors and Putin himself. The FSB trio has been replaced by a whole host of young officials who have cut their teeth in various state structures; all of them are close to Putin, rather than to the “state corporations.”

Dmitry Mironov. Having served as one of Putin’s aides and then Deputy Interior Minister, Mironov completed a term as governor of the Yaroslavl Region. In October 2021, he was appointed presidential assistant with responsibility for personnel issues in the power structures. He replaced Anatoly Seryshev, who became presidential representative in the Siberian Federal District.

Thus, four months before the start of the war, Mironov was handed control of military personnel and, more widely, personnel throughout the power structures. In June 2022, Mironov became head of the Kremlin commission on state service, effectively giving him behind-the-scenes responsibility for all personnel issues. During Putin’s second presidential term (2004–2008), this role had been carried out by Viktor Ivanov. Subsequently, the commission was led by the head of the presidential administration, first Sergei Ivanov and later Anton Vaino.

During Vaino’s tenure, these crucial powers were transferred to the direct control of representatives of the FSB and the Federal Protection Service. At the same time, the role of the head of the presidential administration was downgraded, and the organisation became decentralised.

The Presidential Administration as “the President” Writ Large

All officials holding leading roles in the presidential administration have remained in post. Maxim Oreshkin joined the team as the seventh deputy and retained his core responsibilities as assistant for economic affairs. Three other assistants have been added: Alexei Dyumin, Nikolai Patrushev and Ruslan Edelgeriev. The latter has nominally raised his status from adviser: de jure, he is responsible for matters of climate change, and de facto, he serves as the representative for Chechnya in Putin’s “court.” Dyumin and Patrushev have been assigned new responsibilities.

Patrushev is responsible for ship-building. Dyumin has the military-industrial complex in his portfolio, as well as managing the activities of the State Council and the development of sport. Dyumin is the second presidential assistant, following Mironov, to have transitioned from Putin’s bodyguard to serving as a regional governor. Igor Levitin, the long-serving secretary of the State Council, has left his position as assistant.

This reshuffle, along with changes in the structure of the presidential administration after Putin’s inauguration, strengthened the position of those responsible for transport within the government. A geostrategic maritime directorate has also been created in the presidential administration.

Nikolai Patrushev. Patrushev has moved from secretary of the Security Council to the specially-created post of presidential assistant with responsibility for ship-building. He has also retained his position as a permanent member of the Security Council, and has kept the team from his previous post. (Sergei Shoigu, like Dmitry Medvedev, looks superfluous in the Security Council, and has not been allowed to take any of his old team with him to his new post.)

The creation of the Maritime Collegium under Patrushev effectively makes him “First Lord of the Admiralty” and a key figure in the Kremlin’s project to strengthen Russia’s position as a great maritime state. As shown in the recent NEST report “Mistress of the Seas,” the logic behind the Kremlin’s large-scale transport geostrategic projects is preparation for confrontation with the West, lasting not years but decades.

Patrushev’s deputy in the Security Council, Sergei Vakhrukov, has been appointed head of the newly created President’s Office for National Maritime Policy. Another new office, for state policy on the military-industrial complex, is headed by Viktor Yevtukhov, Deputy Industry Minister with responsibility for shipbuilding. Other members of this large team are Vitaly Savelyev and Igor Levitin. Savelyev, a former Transport Minister, has been promoted to Deputy Prime Minister, while Levitin is now responsible for international cooperation in the transport field.

While retaining his influence in the Security Council, Patrushev has assumed a role directly accountable to Putin, focusing on a key geopolitical priority for the Kremlin: the implementation of the country’s maritime doctrine, which Patrushev has been developing since the onset of the war in Ukraine. Patrushev was Secretary of the Security Council under Putin’s chairmanship, and he is now the chairman of the renewed and revitalized Maritime Collegium of the Russian Federation.

Maritime Collegium. The new Collegium was created on August 13th to replace the government Maritime Collegium which had been set up in 2002. The last chairman of this earlier agency was the Deputy Prime Minister, Denis Manturov, and his number two was Dmitry Patrushev. The Collegium has 50 members, including the ministers for trade, transport, agriculture, and education and science; the heads of each of the country’s coastal regions; the heads of the border guards and the Main Directorate of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation; and the heads of all the major shipbuilding companies.

The members of the Collegium are divided into three councils: the Council for the Strategic Development of the Navy, the Council for the Defense of Russia’s National Interests in the Arctic, and the Council for the Development and Provision of Maritime Activities. Accordingly, as chairman of the Collegium, Patrushev has three deputies, one for each council: his former deputy in the Security Council, Sergei Vakhrukov; the “viceroy” of the Arctic and the Far East, Yury Trutnev; and Igor Levitin.

Putin’s Personnel Reserve

A good half of the new appointees are either relatives of Putin’s associates or of Putin himself, or former aides to the president. The important thing is that they belong only to the Putin family in a broad sense and have no other corporate loyalties. Alongside Boris Kovalchuk, Irina Podnosova, Alexei Dyumin, and Valery Pikalyov, the following officials are particularly notable:

• Anna Tsivileva, born Putina (the president’s first cousin once removed), the State Secretary—Deputy Minister of Defense, and her husband Sergei Tsivilev, the Minister of Energy.
• Dmitry Patrushev, son of Putin’s confidant Nikolai Patrushev; Deputy Prime Minister.
• Pavel Fradkov, son of Mikhail Fradkov, former Prime Minister and Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service; Deputy Minister of Defense.
• Andrei Turchak, son of Anatoly Turchak, former deputy of Vladimir Putin in the St. Petersburg branch of the “Our Home—Russia” party (predecessor to “United Russia”); Governor of the Altai Republic.

Former Aides Now in Positions of Power

Two of Putin’s former aides, Alexei Dyumin and Valery Pikalyov, have been given important positions. Dyumin served as the Governor of the Tula Region for eight years (2016–2024) and Pikalyov was head of the administration of the governor of St. Petersburg from 2019–2024. As well as his position as assistant to the president and Secretary of the State Council, Dyumin is now a member of the enlarged Security Council and is responsible for the military-industrial complex and sport.

Dyumin is already credited with various achievements, from playing a key role in the annexation of Crimea in 2014, to conducting negotiations with Yevgeny Prigozhin during his mutiny in 2023. But these rumours have never been substantiated, nor has the speculation that Dyumin could be a potential successor to Putin.

This active promotion of personal bodyguards and Putin’s aides to state posts — sometimes known as the “Praetorian Guard phenomenon”—started in the period 2014–2016, when a number of those officials holding security positions were named as regional governors.

“Praetorian Guard” members currently have the following responsibilities:

• Dmitry Mironov, personnel issues in the power structures.
• Alexei Dyumin, the military-industrial complex and coordination of the executive power system.
• Viktor Zolotov, Rosgvardiya, Russian national gendarmerie and internal military force.
• Alexander Kurenkov, the Emergency Situations Ministry.
• Valery Pikalyov, the Federal Customs Service, a key post when dealing with sanctions.

None of Putin’s bodyguards has yet shown any particular ability in their new areas. However, that is not what is expected of them. The most important thing is that they stand alone, without strong family ties or links to the “state corporations,” and that they are personally loyal to Putin.

Individuals

None of the major figures in positions of power have been strengthened by the reshuffle:

• Mikhail Mishustin (aged 58), Prime Minister (according to the Constitution, he would become acting president should Putin be incapacitated), has retained his post and kept his team. That said, he now has a powerful counterweight in the shape of the new Minister of Defense, Andrei Belousov.
• Andrei Belousov (65), Minister of Defense. Given the wartime conditions, Belousov has lost no status compared to his previous post as First Deputy Prime Minister, which formally is a higher post. Indeed, it is within the Ministry of Defense that the most radical changes have taken place, to the extent that it has become “a government within the government.” Belousov himself is a loner who does not have his own team. He has the nickname of “Stalinist people’s commissar”—a workaholic who is tough on himself and others. He did not select the new leadership of the Defense Ministry—likely leaving that task to Putin himself; as a result, the team is diverse and appears to lack unity.
• Sergei Chemezov (72) is head of the Rostec state corporation, which has an important role to play in the war. He might have become the main beneficiary of the new appointments, were it not for the problems in the military-industrial complex, which have led to audits of both the United Aircraft Construction Corporation and the United Shipbuilding Corporation.
• Alexei Dyumin (52) is a faithful servant. He was simply a figurehead when in post as a governor, the real work being carried out by Chemezov’s team.
• Nikolai Patrushev (73) is one of the few appointees who de facto has remained in control of the structure which he led previously. Another point in his favor is that his son, Dmitry Patrushev, has been promoted from Agriculture Minister to Deputy Prime Minister with responsibility for agriculture.
• Denis Manturov (55) is close to Chemezov and Rostec, and has risen during the war from Minister for Industry and Trade to Deputy Prime Minister (in 2022), and now to First Deputy Prime Minister. He is also a member of the Security Council.
• Andrei Kostin (68) is the head of one of the largest Russian banks, VTB. Kostin built his career in the Foreign Ministry. He is close to Putin, and on Putin’s instructions he took control of the United Shipbuilding Corporation in 2023.
• Sergei Kiriyenko (62) is first deputy head of the presidential administration and is responsible for internal policy, including in the occupied territories of Ukraine. Unofficially, he continues to control Rosatom, the state nuclear energy corporation, which he led until 2016. Kiriyenko is close to the Kovalchuk brothers. He is the leader of the Diveyevo Brotherhood—a religious “club” similar to a masonic lodge. (Many officials are Brotherhood members, including Mishustin and Belousov). The arrival of Alexei Dyumin has raised questions about the influence of Kiriyenko.

Conclusion

What is new in Putin’s actions in wartime is that he has made fewer changes in personnel than usual, while doing everything to increase his personal control. The reshuffle involves just a narrow circle of trusted people, whom Putin has known for decades. Those who act as his “overseers” are members of his family, the children of members of his close circle, and his bodyguards. This points towards ensuring maximum stability of the system and the status quo.

Beginning in 2014, and especially since the start of the full-scale war in 2022, the elite have become ever more dependent on Putin, while he has become less dependent on them. In this sense, Putin is a tsar, but he is an ageing tsar, and no one knows how much time he has left. He cannot do as he used to and make individual changes at the top of the Russian elite, without considering how this would affect the balance between the main groups. All Putin can do is change the way the system functions and the significance of the individuals within it, either leaving them as they are or simply tweaking their official status.

So, for instance, Dmitry Kozak has held on to his position as deputy head of the presidential administration, even though he has disappeared completely from public view. Sergei Shoigu has been given a prestigious position as secretary of the Security Council, but he has lost his former team and his resources, leaving him merely sitting in a gilded cage.

Unlike in peacetime when there was a clear career path, many personnel appointments now look like sideways moves or demotions. The conditions of war have allowed Putin as commander-in-chief to place people where he needs them, giving no consideration to what these changes might mean for a person’s future career.

Since 2020, when quarantine demands were first imposed on everyone who met the president, the chances of Putin receiving objective information from a variety of sources have been radically reduced. Today, personal meetings are limited to regular reports from those in the power structures, or cosy chats with senior figures, such as the Kovalchuk brothers or Igor Sechin. More frequent meetings with the “liberals” in his circle—German Gref or Alexei Kudrin—interfere with the military agenda, meaning that all issues not involving military or military-industrial matters have been put on the back burner.

As a result, the ageing autocrat Putin looks ever more like Stalin in his later years: deeply suspicious, burdened by old comrades and surrounded by silent servants.

Individual figures in the elite do not pose a threat to Putin’s regime of personal power. The weak point of the regime is not individual figures, but the elite as a whole. Having become a military chieftain, Putin has weakened the people in his circle; he is not so much afraid of a conspiracy by members of the elite as of negative shifts in mass sentiment for him — both elites and citizens. He has become more sensitive than before to public support.

This means that the West needs to communicate not so much with individual figures, but with the widest possible elite circle with emphasis on public appeals and clarification of its position.

In policy in general, including personnel policy, the Kremlin acts largely proactively and with a strategic perspective of long-term confrontation with the West. Accordingly, the West also needs a serious and calibrated long-term strategy in relation to Russia.