The White House announced on Tuesday that the United States had reached agreements with both Russia and Ukraine ‘to ensure safe navigation, eliminate the use of force, and prevent the use of commercial vessels for military purposes in the Black Sea’. However, no firm trilateral framework was established; there are only bilateral agreements between the United States and each party. The public statements by each show differences while it is clear that Russia has emerged as the main beneficiary.

Diverging objectives and strategic interests 

Although the current talks have been dubbed a ‘second grain deal’, grain exports are not the primary focus for either Russia or Ukraine. For Moscow, the priority is the easing of sanctions on companies and banks involved in the export of food, fertilisers and fish products, as well as the import of agricultural machinery. Kyiv’s priority is the protection of critical infrastructure.

The key element of the agreement is a commitment by both sides to refrain from attacking commercial shipping in the Black Sea. This provision clearly benefits the Kremlin since Ukraine is already exporting grain safely through the so-called ‘Romanian corridor’ along the western edge of the Black Sea.

Securing favourable terms for the export of food and fertilisers is an important priority for Russia. Sales of nitrogen fertiliser offer a more reliable source of income for the state budget compared to liquefied natural gas produced in the Arctic (nitrogen fertiliser is derived from natural gas). An additional advantage for Moscow would be the opening of a new, safe route for oil tankers operating out of Novorossiysk.

Fault lines and escalation triggers

Russia’s potential use of the agreement to expand its military presence in the western Black Sea is already prompting concern in Kyiv. Ukraine’s Defence Minister, Rustem Umerov, warned that any movement of Russian warships outside the eastern part of the Black Sea would violate the agreement and that Ukraine would be entitled to ensure its self-defence.

The Black Sea remains the only theatre of war where Ukraine maintains a consistent advantage: a significant part of the Russian Black Sea Fleet has been disabled, with the remainder pushed eastwards toward the Russian and Abkhazian coasts.

Dossier Center NEST Centre’s Partner

Russia is unhappy about the lack of an inspection regime for vessels bound for Ukrainian ports, because of concerns that they may be transporting weapons. 

The agreement also fails to address sea-launched Russian strikes on Ukraine despite the importance for Kyiv of protecting port infrastructure. At the same time, Russia is concerned about the security of the Kerch Bridge, ferry routes, and the land corridor to Crimea. Yet no reciprocal guarantees have been agreed—such as Ukraine refraining from attacks on the bridge in return for Russian assurances not to target port facilities.

Regional stability

The Black Sea remains strategically vital for achieving Russia’s geopolitical ambitions in the Middle East and Africa, including its military presence in both as well as logistical access. The main importers of Russian grain in 2024 included Egypt (11 million tonnes out of a total 72), Turkey (7.2 million tonnes), Iran (5.6 million tonnes), Saudi Arabia (4.6 million tonnes), and Bangladesh (3.9 million tonnes).

Turkey has a major interest in the successful outcome of ceasefire negotiations between Russia and Ukraine since stability in the Black Sea basin remains a cornerstone of Ankara’s regional security strategy.

While welcoming the resumption of US–Russia dialogue, Turkey maintains that no new agreement for the Black Sea region can be complete without security guarantees. In Ankara’s view, all parties must commit to a comprehensive ceasefire—on land, at sea, and in the air.

Ruslan Suleymanov NEST Centre Associate Fellow

While the proposed moratorium on strikes against energy infrastructure may offer a relatively balanced step toward mutual restraint, the Black Sea agreement clearly favours Russia at this stage. Moscow’s diplomacy has secured the potential prospect of sanctions relief, without assuming any substantive obligations to scale back its military activity.