It is shown by numerous independent sociological sources that Russian society is generally indifferent to the war in Ukraine with just a minority of genuine supporters. But what people are afraid of is an involuntary mobilisation; the growth of organised crime (which in reality is only starting to be seen, although many people are expecting it); and they are fearful of those returning from the frontline.

Executive summary

• A sudden ceasefire would trigger fierce competition for shrinking resources between local administrative powers, law enforcement, and criminal networks – against a backdrop of infrastructural decay and demographic crisis.
• Fear of another  random mobilisation remains the strongest source of anxiety in Russian society, exceeding even concerns about repression or the war itself.
• Returning veterans – especially socially connected contract soldiers – are likely to demand privileges and disrupt local balances of power, challenging both elites and institutions.
• A new wartime elite of pseudo-veterans, bureaucrats, and war-related contractors will compete with true combatants and civilians, particularly in Russia’s periphery.

Introduction

It is clear from numerous sociological sources that Russian society is generally indifferent to the war in Ukraine with just a minority of genuine supporters. But what people are afraid of is an aggressive mobilisation; the growth of organised crime (which in reality is only starting to be seen, although many people are expecting it); and they are fearful of those returning from the frontline. Despite censorship, people hear about almost any violent incident involving war veterans who have come home. They are so concerned about this that it is written about both in local media and on social networks.

Journalists from the Russian opposition publication ‘Vyorstka’ have found 750 victims of such crimes; and even ‘Gazeta.ru’, which is censored, runs a separate column devoted to violent incidents carried out by ‘participants in the special military operation’.

Fear of mobilisation

However, what people fear most is mobilisation. The aggressive mobilisation of 300,000 men, mainly working poor from Russia’s hinterland, which took place over the course of three weeks in September 2022 shook society more than the unleashing of the full-scale invasion in February of that year, never mind the seizure of Crimea in 2014. No other event has had such an influence on the mood of the Russian people. Only the major market crises of 1998 and 2008 even come close.

‘What would you say about your mood in recent days?’, (%)

The mobilisation not only revealed the administration’s lack of organisation, it was also, in some cases, deliberately hindered by the employers of men who could be called up. As a result, the Kremlin is now trying to do everything to avoid a repeat of the situation.

The mobilisation changed people’s attitude to the warring army. This had reached a peak in August 2022. According to Levada Center, 77 per cent of people supported the army at that time, but trust in the army has fallen since then albeit not significantly. It stood at 69 per cent in September 2024.

These ratings show the institutions that were at one time among the three most trusted by society and are based on Levada Center data.

The issue of trust in the army

Even under President Boris Yeltsin, the army was the most trusted public organisation, especially as society began to lose faith in the other state institutions. Since Putin came to power, the army shared this position of trust with the Russian Orthodox Church and the new president, a situation which continued throughout the first decade of this century and beyond. After the crackdown on opposition movements in 2011-12 and the seizure of Crimea, trust in the army (and, indeed, the special services) grew exponentially, especially as society witnessed a virtually bloodless victory in Crimea which at first glance did not demand any sacrifice on the part of ordinary citizens. At the start of the 2020s the army had an even higher trust rating than the president; but the growth in its popularity, which had continued even after the launch of the full-scale invasion, was broken by the mobilisation.

It should also be noted that in post-Soviet Russia, just as in the USSR, the Kremlin has traditionally made sure that the army does not play any political role in society. As a result, no senior career officer has been used as a propaganda figure in the current military campaign, nor have they attained any kind of personal popularity in society. State propaganda praises only private soldiers who have taken part in the war, preferably those who have died in the process.

Consequently, the relative decline in the reputation of the army as a state institution is more likely to suit the Kremlin; as is the system of signing up soldiers on contract since this diverts funds for the conduct of the war to regional budgets (which are responsible for the majority of huge payments), at the same time making citizens less interested in the fate of those who have been paid to take part in the war.

Yet if society reacts calmly to any suggestion that the authorities are hiring new men to take part in the war for large sums of money, the merest hint of an aggressive mobilisation of reservists causes panic; and any attempt to involve conscripts in the fighting is fraught with problems, even in the current climate of repression and censorship.

At the same time, society is not worried about more human rights’ violations, ‘tightening the screws’ or greater repression by the regime. As far as these are concerned, people are more than ready to accept the situation; those people who value human rights are demoralised and divided. But the overwhelming view in society now is that even a human life is not worth much, and political freedom even less.

The challenge of returning war veterans

Nevertheless, despite the stereotypes, the average ‘peaceful’ Russian citizen does not condone violence and is afraid of it. All those who like violence and are not afraid of it are already earning money thanks to the war, while the bravest citizens who are against the war are either in prison or have left the country. The majority of people do not like to take risks of any kind, especially risks to their own person.

As war veterans return in increasing numbers from the front, conflicts will inevitably take place with those they perceive as ‘cowards’ who did not go to fight. This is a dangerous combination given the inevitable decline in living standards and the presence back in Russia of a large number of people who have benefitted from the war financially.

As well as those who have taken part in the fighting, there are others who have passed through the areas of the ‘special military operation’ and its environs:

• Bureaucrats who further their careers by temporarily joining privileged military units (such as the army’s fighting reserve); in reality, these people are pseudo-veterans because they serve away from the dangerous frontline areas and for short periods (3–6 months), while ordinary contract soldiers cannot leave service of their own accord;
• Bureaucrats who have been sent on temporary, well-paid assignments in the occupied territories;
• Those from the power ministries (siloviki) who have been temporary well-paid assignments in the occupied territories;
• Volunteers, pseudo-volunteers and those whose business is involved with the war, both shady and perhaps initially legal, but who have then received work privileges outside the rules in return for helping the frontline;
• Workers who have been on temporary, well-paid assignments connected to the war (e.g., builders engaged in constructing fortifications in areas near the frontline, long-distance lorry drivers, etc.).

These people have all claimed to be participants in the ‘special military operation’ (some with formal privileges, others without); they all have experience of working in lawless areas, and they have definitely widened their social circles – most notably the bureaucrats. They will compete against genuine veterans and against their colleagues who have no military experience and bring a new way of doing things to their local communities, the state apparatus and the power structures.

It should also be noted that there are many families of manual labourers, the technical intelligentsia and others whose professions have been in short supply during the war, whose well-being and social standing have significantly increased. They are at far less risk of being without an income as soon as the ‘special military operation’ is over than those who have been engaged in the fighting; and this cannot but anger the latter group. By the start of 2024 the number of those who had benefitted materially from the war was virtually the same as the number of those who had suffered as a result of it; and hopes for a better future had increased for an even bigger part of the population.

On the other hand, there is a sub-group of people among the contract soldiers (and there are now more contract soldiers in the army than anyone else), who are socially embedded, have maintained their contact with their families, have survived the frontline, and have managed even partially to save some of their earnings from the war for peacetime. These people could cause the greatest problems when they return from the war. They are better connected socially and more ambitious than those who signed up for the front because they were disengaged from society and underprivileged, and they will want to use their military experience, their new connections and their ability to survive in order to utilise their privileges as participants in the ‘special military operation’. What is more, they will not want their level of earnings to fall.

As a result, Russia will see a community of aggressive men coming together who are former mercenaries not just with military experience, but who know how to organise themselves and have made sure that they were well provided for in wartime by using their own money and cooperating with each other (they held common funds in each unit). These people will be able to grind out new positions for themselves in society.

As well as these people, there will be a whole new social layer of around one million citizens who have been wounded in the war, who will be full of resentment for their social circles, and who will be predominantly on Russia’s periphery and in small towns.

So, if the war ends suddenly, there will be a cruel and vicious competition for diminishing resources at every level of society. This will involve administrative resources, manipulation of the powers of the law enforcement authorities, and the direct use of criminal violence; there will be a large grey zone overlapping these three areas. And all this will be taking place against a background of collapsing infrastructure, an under-financed social sphere and a dangerously low birth-rate.

Such a society will not want to accept state investment in anything it considers peripheral, be it the restoration of the occupied territories, aid to allies or even investment in military industry. People will also resent improved pay for industrial workers who did not fight at the front, when veterans of the war are trying to readapt to life in peacetime; and few of these people will be willing to take up manual labour.

And on the other hand, society is likely to be in favour of the increased repression of criminals to take violent crime off the streets; and even for the renewal in some (probably limited) form of military action since this would have the same effect and may even lead to a partial revival of the economy. In any case, it is highly probable that people would hope for this; after all, it worked after 2022.

Conclusion

To maintain control over society, it would make more sense for Putin to start a small new war as soon as the current one is over (or even before this one finishes). This would prevent most contract soldiers from returning home, while mobilised soldiers would be released as a gesture of goodwill. Such a war would not have to be victorious; rather, it would be drawn out, albeit with regular small successes. Its purpose would be to justify the militarisation of society and the investment in rearming and the subsequent fall in the standard of living; and also to occupy both those who had been fighting and the aggressive part of the population, who otherwise would have to be partially integrated into society with unpredictable political consequences and partially neutralised.