The clash over Greenland has triggered a serious crisis in relations between the United States and Europe and reinforced doubts about the durability of NATO. For Russia, this reduces the likelihood of a united Western response to its actions, and expands its room for manoeuvre in Europe. However, the increasing signs of disarray in US-Europe ties are creating a growing risk for the Kremlin at home: the expectations of the most militarised and radical segment of society are beginning to diverge from Vladimir Putin’s priorities and capabilities. In the Arctic, the possibility of a sharply increased US military presence in Greenland would generate additional costs for Russia that it cannot easily afford. 

Awaiting NATO’s disintegration

The main beneficiary of the rift between the US and Europe is Vladimir Putin. In line with the Kremlin’s desires, Donald Trump’s actions are strengthening a version of world order in which short-term national interests and coercive power prevail over alliances and legal norms.

The ‘Donroe’ doctrine opens the door for the Kremlin to claim analogous rights in Eastern Europe and across the post-Soviet space (the same logic also applies to China and its view of South-East Asia). This helps Moscow to justify its policy towards Ukraine and lowers the political cost of the war. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has been quick to argue that Crimea is no less important for Russia than Greenland is for the US.

From Moscow’s perspective, the Trump administration’s actions are seriously weakening the cohesion of NATO. The downgrading of allied commitments, the preference for bilateral deals over multilateralism, and the clear readiness of the US to revise its prior guarantees at any moment and on any pretext all serve to undermine trust within the alliance, and deepen disagreements between Europe and the US. This, in turn, fuels frictions within Europe. For example, the divisive issue of nuclear weapons is back on the agenda: in Germany, there have already been calls for a European alternative to the US nuclear umbrella.

Seen from the Kremlin, the erosion of transatlantic solidarity reduces the likelihood of a unified Western response to Moscow’s actions and expands Russia’s room for political manoeuvre, both in Ukraine and beyond. At the same time, it exposes Europe’s severe military limitations, as Washington shifts primary responsibility for security onto the European members of NATO. In the short term, this situation creates additional opportunities for the Kremlin to break the European coalition of support for Ukraine. In addition, the tensions around Greenland are seen as distracting Western policymakers from the war in Ukraine and the task of deterring Russian aggression in Europe.

For many years, Putin’s European policy has aimed at fomenting divisions within the EU, polarising political tensions in key European countries, weakening transatlantic ties, and undermining NATO as the foundation of collective European security. Trump’s actions are now delivering exactly these outcomes.

At the same time, by widening the scope of permissible actions, this dynamic places the Kremlin in an awkward position. For the militaristically inclined, pro-government audience, Trump’s behaviour appears to demonstrate the effectiveness of a forceful approach, raising expectations of similar decisive action from Putin. For example, the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro is viewed as a masterclass in how to deploy military power decisively and effectively, revealing Russia’s inability to compete with the US. Taken together, this heightens domestic sensitivity among hardliners to any signs of caution or delay on the part of the Kremlin.

Russia’s interests in the Arctic

Despite short-term gains, Trump’s actions create certain difficulties for Russia, above all in the Arctic, a region Moscow regards as strategically important and where an increase in the US presence would affect Russian interests.

Since the 2010s, Russia has steadily strengthened its presence in the Arctic, including through the construction of new military bases and airfields. Since 2023, it has conducted joint patrols and bomber flights with China near Alaska, causing serious concern in Washington.

An expansion of the US military presence in Greenland, including the opening of new bases, would be perceived by Moscow as a threat that requires countermeasures. This would entail additional investment in defensive infrastructure, the construction and maintenance of which in Arctic conditions is extremely costly and exceeds the Kremlin’s available financial capacity.

However, the region’s importance for the Kremlin goes beyond the military domain. Moscow is counting on ice melt to extend the navigation season, and is seeking to develop the Northern Sea Route for shipping from China to Europe and the east coast of the US and Canada. Under conditions of free passage without the need to navigate ice, a voyage via the Northern Sea Route from Shanghai to Baltimore would take 18–20 days, compared with 36–40 days via the Panama Canal. The route from Shanghai to Rotterdam, which takes 30 days via the Suez Canal and 40 for a ship sailing around Africa, would be reduced to 20 days. 

By 2035, Moscow plans to invest around 1.8 trillion roubles (approximately $23 billion as of 24 January 2026) in the development of the Northern Sea Route, increasing cargo volumes to 238 million tonnes per year. Russia is actively investing in the expansion of its nuclear icebreaker fleet, port infrastructure, and digital navigation systems.

However, the scale of Moscow’s Arctic ambitions clearly outpaces the actual results. On the one hand, the warming of the Arctic is happening more slowly than expected, and the duration of ice-free navigation is not increasing. On the other hand, under the current sanctions regime, foreign shipping companies are reluctant to use Russian infrastructure: in 2025, transit volumes of cargo from outside Russia fell by 11 per cent compared with 2024, to 2.84 million tonnes. This is more than four times lower than Russian authorities had planned in summer 2022.

In addition, the projections for use of the Northern Sea Route assumed a substantial increase in exports, primarily oil (Vostok Oil) and liquefied natural gas (Arctic LNG 2). However, LNG exports have been blocked by Western sanctions. The Vostok Oil project, owned by Rosneft, is encountering significant delays. It was expected to export 30 million tonnes of oil as early as 2024, with a gradual increase to 100–115 million tonnes per year, but industrial production has yet to begin. To some extent, this is explained by the OPEC+ agreement, under which Russia reduced oil production in 2023–2024 and is currently barred from increasing exports. However, the principal obstacle remains the loss of access to advanced development technologies.

The Russian government’s forecast envisaged the transportation of 110 million tonnes of cargo from Russia via the Northern Sea Route in 2025, yet the actual figure was 37 million tonnes, three times lower than planned.

The prospects for the Northern Sea Route, even given favourable environmental conditions and the successful implementation of technically challenging projects, depend to a large extent on an improvement in relations with western countries and the easing of sanctions. At the same time, rising military tensions between Russia and the US in the Arctic could complicate the normalisation of commercial ties and undermine the long-term economic rationale for further investment in the new shipping lane.