Home / Short Analysis / The war comes home: Russians are starting to recognise the economic consequences of the invasion of Ukraine
People wait a bus at a bus stop next to gun turrets of a Soviet-era cruiser installed as a monument in St. Petersburg, Russia, June 22, 2026. (AP Photo/Dmitri Lovetsky)
People wait a bus at a bus stop next to gun turrets of a Soviet-era cruiser installed as a monument in St. Petersburg, Russia, June 22, 2026. (AP Photo/Dmitri Lovetsky)

The war comes home: Russians are starting to recognise the economic consequences of the invasion of Ukraine

The war comes home: Russians are starting to recognise the economic consequences of the invasion of Ukraine

6 minutes

Almost half of Russians report that the state of the economy has worsened over the past three months. The share of respondents who negatively assess the government’s economic priorities is rising gradually. Although positive assessments still predominate, their share is declining slowly. Another question, included for the first time, produced a striking result: three quarters of Russians believe that the war is worsening the state of the Russian economy, with more than half (51 per cent) convinced that it is worsening it significantly.


A public opinion survey conducted for NEST during the final ten days of June indicates a deterioration in assessments of the state of the Russian economy. Compared with previous surveys, these assessments have shifted from moderately positive to neutral. When asked about the state of the economy in June, half of respondents (51 per cent) still chose the response ‘so-so’. However, the shares who have positive and negative assessments are now equal (22 per cent each), whereas just two months earlier the share of positive assessments was one and a half times higher than that of negative assessments.

Russians report a marked deterioration in the state of the economy in recent months. When asked how the situation had changed over the past three months, almost half of respondents (49 per cent, compared with 36 per cent in both April and February) replied that it had ‘slightly worsened’ or ‘worsened significantly’. The share of those who reported an improvement declined from 18 per cent in both February and April to 12 per cent in June.

The evidence suggests that Russians assess the state of the economy primarily on the basis of information from external sources rather than their own experience or changes in the financial situation of their households. Responses to the question of how the cost of living affects respondents’ households remained unchanged from previous surveys. Around 30 per cent selected each of the first three options – that it places a ‘severe’ or ‘moderate’ financial burden on the household, or that financial difficulties could arise if the cost of living continues to increase – while around 10 per cent said that it was not a concern.

Similarly, the increase in negative assessments of the economy has been accompanied by less pronounced changes in assessments of the government’s performance, although the shift towards disapproval is nonetheless evident. Just under half of respondents continue to believe that the government’s economic policy priorities are correct, while slightly more than one third take the opposite view. However, the share who think the government’s priorities are correct has declined slightly, while the share who do not has increased. As a result, the gap between the two positions has narrowed noticeably: whereas in April the distribution was 48 per cent to 33 per cent, by June it had shifted to 45 per cent to 37 per cent. The share of respondents who believe that the government’s actions create more problems than positive outcomes increased from 33 per cent to 37 per cent. Meanwhile, the share of those who take the opposite view declined from 15 per cent to 12 per cent.

Another important question, included for the first time, produced a striking result: three quarters of Russians believe that the war (the questionnaire used the official term ‘special military operation’) is worsening the state of the Russian economy, with 51 per cent of respondents saying that it is ‘worsening it significantly’. Only 12 per cent responded that the war is improving the state of the economy, and just 3 per cent said that it is ‘improving it significantly’.

Given that more than three quarters of Russians think that the war has had a negative effect on the economy, it is unsurprising that this view predominates across all survey groups – broken down by age and gender, occupation, education level, place of residence, and trust in different sources of information – making any discussion of those who say it has had a positive effect highly qualified. Relatively greater optimism about the war’s impact on the economy (defined as a positive assessment by at least 18 per cent of respondents, 150% of the average for the sample as a whole) is found among those who believe that the country is moving in the right direction, respondents who did not complete secondary education (18 per cent of whom say the war has had a positive effect on the economy), and those who place the greatest trust in television and the print media (among whom 19 per cent say it has had a positive effect). Even among pensioners and people of retirement age – traditionally supporters of Putin – the level of optimism does not exceed 15 per cent.

In addition, it is noteworthy that the level of optimism is markedly higher in Moscow and in large cities (with populations of more than 500,000), at 15 per cent, than in small towns and rural areas, where it stands at 10 per cent.

This gap between assessments of the government’s priorities and performance, on the one hand, and of the war’s impact on the economy, on the other, can be explained in two ways. Either Russians believe that ‘we did not start it’ and therefore do not hold the government responsible for the war’s negative effect on the economy, or they understand that this is ‘Putin’s war’, that it must be distinguished from government policy, and that the government should not be held responsible for its consequences.

Methodology

The nationwide survey was conducted through face-to-face interviews during the final ten days of June 2026 using a representative sample of Russia’s urban and rural population. The sample comprised 1,610 respondents aged 18 and over. The margin of error for a sample, at a 95 per cent confidence level, does not exceed:

  • 3.4 per cent for indicators close to 50 per cent;
  • 2.9 per cent for indicators close to 25 per cent / 75 per cent;
  • 2.0 per cent for indicators close to 10 per cent / 90 per cent;
  • 1.5 per cent for indicators close to 5 per cent / 95 per cent.
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of the NEST Centre.

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