The talks between Trump and Putin did not produce an immediate comprehensive ceasefire, but they cannot be considered a failure. There was progress despite the lack of a breakthrough. The Kremlin remains interested in further negotiations – albeit on its own terms – with the aim of achieving a real result.

At the same time, Putin may still use the negotiations to prolong the conflict, weaken the West, and maintain control of the situation. If his primary objective proves unattainable, this scenario would be an acceptable alternative.

The Kremlin is relying on divisions within Europe, where some countries are more committed than others to supporting Ukraine. Its strategy includes pressuring the United States to restrict military aid to Kyiv and using economic leverage – such as Nord Stream – to sow discord in European ranks. Russia is also manipulating fears over the possible use of nuclear weapons.

Trump gains a clear advantage in his dealings with Europe through these negotiations. For now, Europe is in a holding pattern – waiting for Trump and Putin to reach a ceasefire agreement. This is a bilateral arrangement between Russia and the US, meaning NATO ceases to exist as before. If any European country challenges the ceasefire – which is inevitable – Trump can simply say: ‘You broke my ceasefire; that was your decision.’

A division is already apparent – some European states are willing to invest in collective defence in response to the war in Ukraine, while others are not. This fragmentation works in Putin’s favour. The more complicated the situation, the more room he has for manoeuvre.

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Moscow is increasingly concerned about the escalating mobilisation of European countries, particularly Germany. Although European decision-making is slow, in the long term it could create significant difficulties for Russia. For now, Putin has time to prepare counter-measures, intensifying efforts to divide Europe as a political unit and undermine internal stability in key countries.

Russia’s next priorities in the talks will be lifting sanctions, limiting Ukraine’s military capabilities, and reducing or halting arms supplies to Ukraine. The latter will require European involvement in the negotiation process and slow down momentum.

It is clear that Russian and US interests are not limited to the war in Ukraine. Putin and Trump have discussed the Middle East, including issues such as containing Iran and preventing threats to Israel. 

A possible strategic agreement between Washington and Moscow could include the return of American businesses to Russia and re-establishment of broader economic cooperation in the region. The scope of the negotiations is expanding to cover economic incentives for US companies, enabling Putin to link a settlement in Ukraine with other matters important to Trump while reinforcing his own global influence. Cooperation in the Arctic and use of the Northern Sea Route are a separate track of US-Russia economic relations that continues to interest both sides..

For Moscow, the discussion of European ‘boots on the ground’ to oversee a ceasefire appears more like a tool for strengthening negotiating positions rather than a realistic possibility. In any case, the Kremlin will veto the deployment of a significant foreign military force, and any such move without Moscow’s approval remains improbable, given the experience of the first three years of the war. A more viable approach is airspace control, which could be effective and does not require basing aircraft in Ukraine. 

From a military standpoint, the Kremlin is keen to reach an agreement before the summer to avoid mobilisation and the redirection of civilian industry to military production – measures that could destabilise the domestic situation. The Russian military may attempt an offensive on Zaporizhzhia, but any plans to capture Kharkiv or Kyiv would require considerably more manpower.

Preliminary agreements are possible next week, with European countries joining the process to discuss ceasefire provisions. The goal will be to complete the process by the end of April.

Putin sees mobilisation as a last resort if negotiations fail. He continues to use nuclear threats to pressure Europe and, following a ceasefire, may seek a new conflict to maintain domestic political stability. At the same time, the Kremlin recognises that Trump will find it harder to pressure Putin than to pressure Ukraine – a dynamic that can work to Russia’s advantage.

Expert comments

Putin may resort to mobilisation but he would rather avoid it

Putin is keeping his diplomatic options open. He wants negotiations that bring results but he is not boxed in. While he would prefer to avoid certain political consequences of a prolonged war, he is not prepared to do so at any cost. If negotiations go badly, he may resort to mobilisation but he would rather avoid it. He seeks agreements, but if the terms are completely unacceptable, he will continue the war.

Vladimir Pastukhov
Research Director

Putin will need a new conflict after a ceasefire

The Kremlin understands the challenges posed by the mass return of soldiers. Efforts to establish a system for reintegrating them into civilian life are intensifying. But it is also logical to anticipate a new conflict – one that Putin may require for domestic political reasons, to prevent returning soldiers from destabilising the situation. In this context, a recent interview with Nikolai Patrushev, former Secretary of the Russian Security Council, is worth noting, as he raises grievances against the Baltic states and Finland.

Ella Paneyakh
Senior Research Fellow, Head of Sociology

Putin will use the US to demilitarise Ukraine

Putin sees his advantage in these negotiations – Trump is under greater time pressure. Putin needs to play along with Trump and slow the process to maximise concessions later. He has set the agenda and will now use the US to persuade Ukrainians and Europeans that there is no alternative to Ukraine’s demilitarisation.

John Lough
Senior Research Fellow, Head of Foreign Policy

Trump finds it difficult to pressure Putin

Putin is testing how far Trump is willing to apply additional pressure. Russia has slightly reduced the intensity of the war, but at this pace, a ceasefire remains distant. Trump faces a choice – either continue pressuring Ukraine and move closer to Putin’s position or attempt to push Putin towards Ukraine’s stance. The former is clearly easier. And if Trump ever decides to pressure Putin, the Kremlin can easily drop one of its many ‘non-negotiable’ demands to relieve that pressure.

Sergei Aleksashenko
Senior Research Fellow, Head of Economics