As soon as the US and Israel began the 2026 war with Iran, Moscow called for a halt to military action and offered its services as a mediator.
‘Russia, as always, stands ready to assist in advancing peaceful solutions grounded in international law, mutual respect, and a balanced consideration of interests,’ said the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a statement on February 28.
The new escalation in the Middle East poses a huge challenge for the Kremlin, despite the potential for short-term gains.
On the one hand, the conflict has led to a sharp rise in oil prices. The price of Russian Urals crude has already risen by more than 25%, exceeding $90 per barrel, whereas the Russian government assumed a price of $59 per barrel in this year’s budget.
Moreover, the US’s focus on the war with Iran is hindering negotiations on a settlement in Ukraine.
On the other hand, the Kremlin is suffering irreparable damage to its image. Although Moscow has no military obligations to Tehran, Russia’s inaction is perceived in Iran as a display of weakness.
In the Middle East, and the Global South in general, which Moscow has used in recent years as a bulwark against the West, real military force is viewed as the decisive factor in international politics. However, both the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad and the current situation in Iran demonstrate that Russia is unable to provide its allies in the region with decisive military assistance.
Trust but verify
Having close contacts with Iran, Israel, and the United States, Moscow could potentially play a mediating role. For example, it could try to contribute (directly or indirectly) to potential negotiations.
In practice, Russia could serve as an alternative mediator ‘behind the curtain’ to exchange messages between the parties. For example, in 2024, Putin asked Iran’s then Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei for a restrained response to Israel’s suspected killing of the leader of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh.
Also, the day before the end of the 12-Day War, Putin met with Iran’s Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, at the Kremlin. The next day, a ceasefire between Iran and Israel was finally achieved.
Putin also received recently killed Ali Larijani, former secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, three times in six months, last July, October, and then in January. The Iranian side confirmed that during at least one of these visits, Larijani delivered a special message from Khamenei to Putin.
All in all, there were some consultations with both Iran and Israel. According to the Russian foreign ministry, Tel Aviv assured Moscow before the war that Israel ‘had no interest in entering into military confrontation with Iran.’
Furthermore, as Amwaj.media reported, Iran and Israel had exchanged secret messages through Moscow in 2025 in order to prevent further escalation, rather than reaching a formal ceasefire agreement.
It will not be possible, however, for the Kremlin to act as a guarantor of any potential ceasefire agreement between Iran, the United States, and Israel. Moscow has no actual capacity to control the situation on the ground.
However, Russia, in coordination with Washington, could facilitate the adoption of a UN Security Council resolution supporting de-escalation. The creation of an international mechanism to monitor compliance with the ceasefire could be the next step.
Suffice it to say that Moscow has already proposed a draft resolution calling on all parties to cease the use of force immediately and return to negotiations.
The very fact that on March 11 the Kremlin did not veto the UN resolution calling on Tehran to stop attacking Gulf nations shows that Moscow is not inclined to be at loggerheads with the US over Iran, but will cooperate on this issue.
At the same time, Russia faces mistrust from all parties to the conflict.
Ever since the Syrian campaign, Iran has suspected Moscow of favouring Israel. These suspicions intensified after last year’s 12-day war, when several Iranian officials openly accused the Kremlin of giving secret intelligence information about the Islamic Republic to the Jewish state.
Washington does not agree at all with Moscow’s prevaricating and intractable stance on Ukraine. Thus, US President Donald Trump expressed his dissatisfaction with Vladimir Putin. However, his stance still contrasts with Joe Biden’s administration, which had almost no contact with the Kremlin.
Israel’s attitude toward Moscow also changed dramatically after the Hamas terrorist attack on October 7, 2023. At the time, Russia not only failed to openly condemn the actions of Palestinian radicals but continued to invite them to Moscow. Tel Aviv viewed such actions as a ‘shameful step’.
Nevertheless, amid the search for an exit strategy, the warring parties’ grievances against Moscow could be temporarily put aside. Although Israel was not interested in ending the conflict in June 2025, Trump convinced Netanyahu to stop.
A chance for Putin
Meanwhile, the colossal economic losses from the Iran War, including the sharp rise in oil prices, are forcing Trump to seek a way out.
Among various options for cooling the oil markets, the US President decided to ease some secondary sanctions against Russia, the world’s third-largest oil producer. The U.S. Treasury Department announced a temporary 30-day waiver (until April 11, 2026) allowing sales of Russian oil already loaded on ships. Intended to stabilise energy markets facing a supply crisis stemming from the conflict with Iran, this move permits transactions with previously sanctioned entities such as Lukoil and Rosneft.
Furthermore, Washington granted India a 30-day waiver, allowing it to purchase some of the 140 million barrels of Russian oil already at sea, a fifth of which is already in Indian waters. This is a relief for Indian refineries, which typically purchase half of their oil from the Persian Gulf.
Trump’s decisions open up an opportunity for Moscow to manoeuvre and exploit the situation around Iran to achieve success in Ukraine.
The Kremlin’s 9 March commentary on the talks between Putin and Trump drew a connection between the wars in Ukraine and Iran.
According to Moscow, ‘Trump once again expressed interest in ending the conflict in Ukraine with a swift ceasefire to achieve a long-term settlement.’
For his part, the American leader also recently linked developments around Iran to the war in Ukraine. Specifically, Trump accused Volodymyr Zelenskyy of prolonging the war and noted that ‘he’s got even fewer cards.’
Strictly speaking, the Kremlin now has a chance to at least offer Trump a deal on Iran in exchange for his concessions on Ukraine. If the US decides to stop this war, it will need a channel (or several channels) for exchanging (indirectly, of course) messages with Iran. Having close contacts with Tehran, Moscow could play this mediating role.
It does not mean that Putin has the ability to stop this war. But he gains an opportunity to contribute to negotiations on any deal between Iran and the US, or at least a ceasefire. With direct contacts in Tel Aviv, Washington, and Tehran, he could serve as an alternative channel for exchanging messages between the conflicting parties.
A long-distance perspective
All in all, the longer the Iran war continues, and the more severe the damage to the global oil market, the more open Washington might be to Moscow’s possible mediating role.
The shipment of uranium could be part of a future deal if a ceasefire is achieved. Russia, as Iran’s closest diplomatic partner, could contribute to the removal of enriched uranium from Iran.
One condition of the possible deal could be moving up to 60% of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile to Russia. On March 9, Rafael Grossi, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said that much of Iran’s near-bomb-grade uranium is likely to be in Isfahan, presumably in tunnels.
As a matter of fact, Moscow already has experience in this matter. In 2015, Iran transferred 9 to 11 tons of enriched uranium to Russia, receiving, in exchange, 137 tons of uranium ore for the development of nuclear energy. Also, Moscow could be a guarantor of the halt of the Iranian nuclear program. But for now, Putin could be at least an alternative channel (if not the main one) between all the conflicting parties.
However, the first step will have to be taken by the conflicting parties themselves when and if they realise that the costs of this war outweigh their achievements on the battlefield.
