The Ukrainian drone strikes on 1 June and sabotage of railway lines across Russia between 1 and 5 June had limited military impact but significant political resonance. They highlighted Ukraine’s ability to conduct targeted attacks on strategic infrastructure and exposed the Russian system’s vulnerability to unconventional threats. The incidents amplified a sense of insecurity within Russia and triggered negative reactions in loyalist circles, fuelling criticism of the security services and military leadership. Collectively, these developments pose a political rather than military challenge for the Kremlin.

Military effect: high resonance, limited damage

According to the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), the drone strikes damaged 41 aircraft and destroyed 13,  including strategic bombers involved in strikes on Ukraine – at Russian airbases in Murmansk, Irkutsk, Ivanovo, Ryazan, and Amur Regions. Open-source intelligence sources confirm the destruction of 12 aircraft. The exact number of such bombers in Russia’s arsenal is unknown, but The Bell, citing Military Balance data, estimates the Russian Aerospace Forces possessed 20 Tu-160, 54 Tu-22M3, and 58 Tu-95MS prior to the attack. The loss of roughly 10 per cent of this fleet is therefore unlikely to seriously impair Russia’s capacity for long-range strikes.

Some western commentary on the consequences of the attacks for Russia’s nuclear triad appears overstated. Although strategic bombers formally make up part of the triad, they are not considered a central component; Russia’s nuclear capability relies primarily on land- and sea-based delivery systems. As such, the strikes have not posed any real threat to its nuclear posture.

From a military standpoint, the sabotage of rail infrastructure is more significant.¹ Given the limited capacity of Russia’s road network, rail remains the primary channel for transporting ammunition, fuel, and personnel – particularly from remote regions like the Urals and the Far East, where alternatives are scarce or inefficient. However, incidents in Bryansk, Kursk, and Voronezh Regions did not result in serious disruption. Damaged sections were quickly repaired, or traffic was re-routed via alternatives.

Silence as a crisis management strategy

The political significance of these attacks exceeds their immediate military consequences. The strikes represent a notable offensive operation by Ukraine, comparable in scale to last year’s incursion into Kursk Region. Despite gradual setbacks along the front line, Ukraine has demonstrated the ability to launch precise, high-impact operations deep inside Russian territory. These attacks have again revealed systemic vulnerabilities: an inability on the part of the Russian authorities to anticipate or coherently respond to unconventional threats. 

The Kremlin’s reaction reflects its usual crisis-management tactic – silence and delay. The focus is on regaining control rather than immediate retaliation. Political and security responses are deferred. Notably, President Putin disappeared from public view for three days, and state media sought to downplay the scale of the events. When he did finally appear, Putin referred to the bridge explosions as ‘terrorist acts’ by Ukraine – making no mention of the destroyed aircraft.

In an effort to preserve control of the narrative, the Kremlin preferred first to gauge the impact of the attacks as well as the reactions of the public and elite before settling on a unified line. In the first 24 hours, this led to Russian-language media being dominated by descriptive reports. Nevertheless, three basic interpretations of events soon emerged against this background:

• The material damage is acknowledged as limited, but the reputational blow is seen as serious, highlighting the need for systemic reform – without naming those responsible.
• The lack of  a public statement by Putin causes bewilderment and leads some voices to call for a demonstrative response, even citing Russia’s nuclear doctrine.
• Ukraine’s actions are seen  as acts of terrorism and an attempt to exert pressure ahead of the next round of negotiations in Istanbul. At the same time, there is active speculation about possible involvement by Western intelligence services – particularly British and American – in planning the sabotage operations.

Ultra-right ‘Z bloggers’: between loyalty and indignation

These narratives are especially visible in the reaction of ‘Z‑bloggers’ – unofficial pro-war commentators operating largely on Telegram. Since 2022, they have become a key part of the loyalist media ecosystem and, in moments of crisis, a critical channel for shaping interpretation. As Ivan Filippov, an analyst of loyalist ultra-nationalist and pro-war media, observes, ‘Z‑bloggers’ were shocked less by the scale of the losses than by the audacity and technological sophistication of the attacks, which they interpreted as the emergence of a new form of warfare. Their anger was directed not at Ukraine, but at Russia’s intelligence services, the military, and the country’s leadership for allowing such a security failure to occur.

‘Z‑bloggers’ play a central role in shaping opinion among Russian loyalist audiences – those who support the government and the war. This makes them both a valuable asset and a potential liability for the Kremlin. While they rarely criticise the president directly, their complaints about the military, Federal Security Service (FSB), and systemic dysfunction are growing louder. Their reaction to the recent attacks is a key indicator of where the state is beginning to lose control over public perceptions of the war.

Appendix. Narrative clusters in Russian media following the latest Ukrainian attacks

Event documentation. This cluster includes posts that report the incidents without offering further interpretation. Examples: ‘damage assessment’, ‘on the ground’, ‘how it happened’.

Interpretation of events. Posts in this cluster present the incidents as evidence of systemic vulnerabilities and political challenges. Authors emphasise the blow to Russia’s authority and the need to rethink strategic approaches in response to Western pressure and emerging threats, such as drones and information warfare. Examples: ‘historic operation’, ‘reassessing missteps’, ‘White House was unaware’.

Russia’s response. This category covers discussions of potential retaliatory measures, including calls for escalation, speculation about response options, and projections of future actions. Examples: ‘time to press the red button’, ‘a major Russian response expected’.

The Ukrainian factor. Posts in this cluster focus on attributing responsibility and framing the attacks as an attempt to influence the course of negotiations in Istanbul. Examples: ‘Zelensky is lying’, ‘Ukrainian terror’, ‘Pautina [operation “Spiderweb”] – a tool to pressure the talks’.

Other. This category includes peripheral content such as everyday reactions, cultural references, and background commentary related to the events.

Footnotes

1. On 31 May and 1 June, railway bridges in Bryansk and Kursk regions were targeted in explosions. In Bryansk, the blast occurred as a passenger train was passing, resulting in seven fatalities and injuring more than a hundred people. A similar incident took place on 5 June in Voronezh Region. The Investigative Committee and the FSB have blamed Ukraine, classifying the incidents as acts of terrorism. ↩︎