Convinced that Russia retains an advantage on the battlefield, President Vladimir Putin sees no need to offer concessions. He prefers a combination of military action and diplomatic pressure – a tactic that, in the Kremlin’s view, the West is no longer able to resist. At the same time, any peace agreement that meets Russia’s conditions would set the stage for a renewed conflict. Ukraine’s ability to defend itself would be weakened as a result of the inevitable political crisis triggered by territorial concessions, and the transatlantic security system would be undermined. This would create an environment that is less predictable and more conducive to further Russian pressure.

What happened

In November, an informal 28-point document leaked to the press, after being discussed within Donald Trump’s circle as a possible basis for future negotiations on Ukraine. Its parameters, including territorial concessions to Russia, constraints on the Ukrainian armed forces, and an agreement that Ukraine would not join NATO, raised serious concerns in Kyiv and in European capitals. After consultations with Ukrainian and European counterparts, the document was reduced to 19 points, with the most contentious elements to be discussed during possible direct talks between Volodymyr Zelensky and Donald Trump.

Why Putin wants the negotiations to continue

From the outset, Putin has viewed the war against Ukraine as part of a broader effort to reshape Europe’s security architecture. At the centre of this project lies the recognition of an exclusive Russian sphere of influence in Europe and, as a consequence, the abandonment of NATO enlargement. In this logic, Ukraine is a key part of Russia’s claimed ‘sphere of interests’. This is why Putin’s principal war aim is to deprive Ukraine of its external sovereignty and, where possible, to restrict its domestic autonomy.¹

In a prolonged war of attrition, Moscow uses negotiations as an additional tool of pressure rather than a means of reaching compromise. The Kremlin is convinced that it can achieve its strategic objectives militarily and that any agreement should merely formalise its gains.

Despite significant Russian losses², the current situation supports the Kremlin’s confidence in the inevitability of victory. Russian forces continue to make slow advances along the front. The economy, although under increasing strain, is able to sustain the current level of military expenditure. Public discontent remains low. At the same time, the Ukrainian army, though still capable, suffers from a shortage of personnel and insufficient supplies of weapons. The situation is further complicated by a new corruption scandal, and the instability of Western support.

In this context, Putin aims to continue exhausting Ukraine’s resources while deepening divisions within the Western coalition. Russian diplomacy seeks to portray Ukraine as the intransigent party and Russia as ostensibly ready for ‘reasonable arrangements’. This allows the Kremlin to count on a more favourable stance from Trump and the strengthening of US pressure on Kyiv and the ‘Coalition of the Willing’.

An acceptable peace and the Kremlin’s trap

Despite the confidence Putin projects, the military outcome remains undecided. Moscow is not achieving a breakthrough that would allow it to claim an imminent victory. Any shift to more intensive military action would require a sharp increase in defence spending and an additional wave of mobilisation. Both carry political risks that Putin seeks to avoid.

In these circumstances, Putin is in no hurry to conclude an agreement but does not rule out discussing the parameters of a potential deal. At the centre of his ‘minimum plan’ lies the formalisation of Russia’s territorial gains, above all in Donetsk and Luhansk Regions. On the margins of the CSTO summit in Bishkek on 27 November, responding to questions about the 28 points proposed by the United States, Putin again stated that the withdrawal of the Ukrainian armed forces from these territories and their ‘return’ to Russia is a mandatory condition for any agreement.

At the same time, the Kremlin may accept what it previously ruled out. Moscow may agree to preserve the size of the Ukrainian army at a level close to that suggested by the United States (600,000 personnel). A large army requires significant budgetary expenditure, which weakens Ukraine in the long term and limits its ability to maintain a resilient defence. Ukraine’s membership in the European Union is also not a critical threat for Moscow, as the prospects for accession in the short to medium term remain low. Security guarantees, even those similar to NATO’s Article 5, may be acceptable if they cannot be implemented effectively. The Kremlin may assume that neither the United States nor European countries would enter a direct military confrontation with Russia in the event of renewed escalation. This lowers the political costs of such guarantees and makes them potentially compatible with Russian interests.

For Putin, another element is fundamental. Ukraine must renounce the territories that Moscow has declared ‘Russian’ and legally formalise this renunciation. This would simultaneously confirm Russia’s military gains and trigger a profound domestic political crisis in Ukraine, undermining the legitimacy of any leadership that agreed to such terms.

Accepting the preservation of Ukrainian sovereignty in exchange for recognising Russia’s ‘rights of the victor’ – territories held by force – is the Kremlin’s political trap for Ukraine and its allies. Over time, this would open up a wide range of possibilities: destabilisation of Ukraine from within would weaken it militarily and politically, allowing Russia to launch a new offensive, forcing Kyiv to conclude that further resistance is futile.

The broader implications of a settlement on Russia’s terms

If Russia succeeds in consolidating control over the occupied territories and imposing a model of limited sovereignty on Ukraine, it will create a precedent for recognising the forcible alteration of borders in Europe. Such an outcome would, in effect, confirm a rejection of Helsinki principles: the inviolability of borders, the prohibition of aggression, and the primacy of international law.

For Eastern European states, this would signal a growing direct threat, accelerate the militarisation of the region, and lead to further reinforcement of NATO forces on the eastern flank. For Western European countries, the consequences would include the need to reassess the role of the United States in European security, strengthen their own defences, and agree on higher military expenditure. This would inevitably exacerbate divisions within the European Union.

For the United States, this scenario also entails significant risks. Consolidating Russia’s territorial gains would weaken the transatlantic system in which Washington plays a central role. If Europe begins to move towards a more autonomous security model, US influence in the region will diminish, and managing European risks will become more complex and more costly.

Against this backdrop, the potential economic benefits for the United States of restoring relations with Russia appear limited. The Russian market remains high-risk due to expanding nationalisation, growing state control, and the absence of reliable mechanisms for protecting investment. As a result, any possible economic dividends would not offset the strategic costs, and such a deal would not serve Washington’s long-term interests.

At the global level, a precedent for legitimising territorial changes achieved by force would weaken non-proliferation and arms-control regimes and reinforce a shift towards balance-of-power dynamics as the primary logic of international security. The international system would become less stable and more fragmented, and the risk of new crises and conflicts would rise significantly.

Endnotes

1. In launching the war against Ukraine, Vladimir Putin also pursued domestic political objectives: mobilising public support and strengthening his legitimacy, in line with other wars initiated by Russia during his presidency and his tenure as prime minister ↩︎
2. According to estimates by independent research groups, by mid-2025 Russia’s cumulative irrecoverable losses, including those killed and severely wounded, may have reached between 440,000 and 650,000 people. ↩︎