Russia is experiencing its most severe demographic crisis in decades. The relatively small generations born in the 1990s and early 2000s are reaching the age of family formation, reducing the number of potential mothers and future births. The war is further increasing mortality among working-age men. At the same time, in the draft budget for 2027–2029, social policy, healthcare, and education account for only around 21 per cent of federal expenditure, less than originally planned, while defence and policing account for around 44 per cent. Judging from this, the Kremlin is prepared to accept a further deepening of the demographic crisis in order to maintain its current budget priorities.
The demographic abyss
Around 1.2 million children were born in Russia in 2024, matching the record low set in 1999. Rosstat does not publish comprehensive demographic data, so estimates for 2025 are indirect: the number of births may have been around 1.18–1.19 million. Around 1.82 million people died in 2024, resulting in a natural population decline of nearly 600,000.
The current population decline is driven by demographic momentum. In the coming years, the relatively small generations of women born in the 1990s and early 2000s will enter their main reproductive years (approximately ages 25–35). As a result, the number of births will continue to fall even if the average number of children per woman stops declining or begins to rise.
Under the medium-variant scenario of Rosstat’s latest demographic forecast, published in 2023, the number of births was projected to fall from 1.25 million in 2023 to 1.14 million in 2027, before beginning to rise in 2028. Under this scenario, the total population is projected to decline from 146.45 million at the beginning of 2023 to 140.96 million by 2036.
Over the next ten years, the number of potential mothers will decline by approximately 8 per cent. The number of women aged 15–49 will fall from around 34.0 million in 2025 to 31.1 million in 2035. Even if fertility rates begin to rise, this will limit the recovery in the absolute number of births.
Addressing the demographic crisis requires sustained investment in healthcare, family policy, and social policy. However, the state appears to have other priorities.
The draft federal budget for 2027–2029 allocates around 44 per cent of federal expenditure (21.4 trillion roubles) to security (the armed forces, police, National Guard, and intelligence services). Social policy, healthcare, and education account for only around 21 per cent (10.2 trillion roubles). Compared with the original plan for 2027, federal funding for social policy has been reduced by 7 per cent, education by 6 per cent, and healthcare by 6.8 per cent. Demographic and social objectives are clearly a lower priority than the armed forces and security services.
Births without support
According to Rosstat data, government spending on family and maternity benefits increased from 0.2 per cent of GDP in 2005 to 0.6 per cent in 2010 and 1.5 per cent in 2023. In 2024, this figure fell to 1.3 per cent of GDP, or 2.6 trillion roubles.
For comparison, in 2021, average public spending on family benefits across countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) stood at 2.3 per cent of GDP. In Sweden and Poland, the figure reached 3.3 per cent, and in Estonia, 3 per cent. Tax relief should also be taken into account, as in some countries (such as Austria, France, and Germany) it adds more than 0.5 per cent of GDP to family benefits.
Thus, Russia’s spending on family benefits remains below that of many developed countries. In countries with the most extensive support for families, spending has reached 3–4 per cent of GDP or more. For Russia, this level could serve as a benchmark, given the declining number of potential mothers and the need to expand not only cash benefits but also access to childcare and housing support.
At the same time, the average total fertility rate across OECD countries in 2024 was almost identical to Russia’s, at 1.4. In Poland and Estonia, the total fertility rate was lower than Russia’s, at 1.10 and 1.18 respectively, having declined steadily since 2021. However, due to the shrinking number of women of reproductive age in Russia, the number of births will continue to fall for several more years even if the total fertility rate remains unchanged.
Deaths due to spending cuts
Another component of Russia’s demographic crisis is premature mortality, which is particularly high among men. The gap in life expectancy between Russian men and women exceeds 10 years and is largely driven by mortality among people of working age (15–59 years).
The gap between Russia and European countries in premature male mortality is considerably wider than the gap in fertility rates. According to World Bank data for 2024, the probability that a 15-year-old male in Russia will die before reaching the age of 60 is almost 30 per cent (294 per 1,000). The EU average is around 10 per cent (97 per 1,000). Thus, the risk of premature death among young Russian men is almost three times as high as among their European counterparts.
The main causes of premature mortality in Russia are cardiovascular diseases, cancer, external causes of death (accidents, suicide, violence, etc.), and, among men, HIV infection and liver diseases, particularly cirrhosis. Diseases of the circulatory system account for around half of all deaths, with an age-standardised mortality rate of 433 per 100,000 people in Russia in 2019, compared with 159 in the EU. A significant proportion of deaths from cancer and HIV occur at relatively young ages.
Since 2022, these causes have been compounded by the full-scale war, which has become another major source of premature mortality, particularly among young men. As of 9 October 2026, Mediazona and the BBC Russian Service estimated that at least 276,000–352,000 Russian military personnel had been killed, predominantly men aged 21–53. According to data as of 24 February 2026, the highest proportional losses among Russia’s larger regions were recorded in Tuva, where they stood at 476 deaths per 100,000 residents, almost four times the national rate. Buryatia and Zabaykalsky Krai, with 400 and 362 deaths per 100,000 residents, followed. In the Altai Republic, which has a population of around 200,000, the figure stands at 316 deaths per 100,000 residents.
Reducing mortality requires adequate healthcare funding, access to medical care, and preventive services. In 2023, domestic government expenditure on healthcare amounted to 4.9 per cent of GDP in Russia, compared with 4.3–5.7 per cent in the Baltic states and Poland, and 6.1–9.6 per cent in Western Europe. The OECD average stood at 8.0 per cent.
Russia’s healthcare expenditure rose sharply during the pandemic, from 3.5 per cent of GDP in 2019 to 5.9 per cent in 2020, before falling to 4.9 per cent in 2021–2023. For much of the 2010s, it stood at around 3 per cent of GDP, below the international benchmark of 5 per cent of GDP recommended by the World Health Organization in order to achieve universal health coverage. This meant chronic resource shortages, the accumulation of infrastructure and staffing problems, and the gradual deterioration of the healthcare system.
Conclusion
The decline in the number of births over the coming years will be difficult to prevent. Relatively small generations of women are entering their main reproductive years, so the number of potential mothers will continue to fall. The scale of the subsequent decline will depend largely on government policy. However, the government’s spending commitments show that demographic objectives are not among the Kremlin’s main priorities.
Family benefits and individual programmes aimed at raising the birth rate remain in place, but their scale is insufficient to offset the long-term consequences of the changes under way. The shrinking working-age population, the ageing of the population, and high premature mortality will increase pressure on the healthcare and social welfare systems. After a prolonged period of underfunding, Russia’s healthcare system will have to cope with the consequences of the war, including post-traumatic stress disorder, other mental health conditions, the need to rehabilitate veterans, and demand for prosthetics. Demand for psychological and psychiatric care will also increase.
A further burden may arise from increasing rates of injuries, domestic violence, and crime, as well as a possible rise in homicides and suicides. This will continue to affect public health and mortality long after the war ends, and dealing with the consequences will require additional resources.
If current budget priorities remain unchanged, the state will focus primarily on addressing the consequences of the demographic crisis while leaving its underlying causes unresolved. Military and security objectives are, in effect, taking precedence over the long-term welfare of the population.
As a result, the state is effectively accepting a further deterioration in the demographic situation as the price of its chosen political priorities. The longer increases in funding for family benefits, healthcare, and social support are postponed, the greater the cumulative demographic losses will be, and the higher the cost of addressing them for future generations.
